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1. Introduction 
Shelah, on p. 356 of [24], remarks that while the traditional second-order 
quantifiers are too strong, "there could be generalized second-order quantifiers 
which are weak erlough for their model theory to be nice, for example by 
satisfying L6wenheim-Skolem, Compactness or Completeness Theorems." He 
goes on to make several suggestions as to specific generalized quantifiers to study, 
one of which is the quantifier " ,~s"  which means "for almost all countable subsets ." 
In this paper we study the logics L~,,o(,a~) and L ..... (a~) obtained by augmenting 
L,,~, and Lo,,~ by this generalized second-order quantifier a~. We prove Complete- 
ness, Compactness and Omitt ing Types Theorems for L,o,o(aa) and the corres- 
por, ding analogues for L,,,,o(n~). 
The logics studied here are closely related to the logic L(Q), where "Ox"  means 
"there exist ut~countably many x." In fact Qx is definable in L(a~) so it is only 
natural that our proof of Completeness should be an extension of the correspond- 
ing Completeness Theorem for L(O) proved in Keisler [15]. Certain rough edges 
in L(O) are smoothed out in L(a~). For example, the crucial axiom which Keisler 
discovered for L(Q) is: Oy 3x q~(x, y) ~ 3x Oy q~(x, y )v  Ox 3y q~(x, y). 
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This cumbersome axiom has effectively blocked a reasonable proof theory for 
L(Q). In L(a~), this axiom is a consequence of the simpler but stronger axiom: 
Vx ~s  q,(x, s) ---, ,.~s Vx ~ s ,t,(x, s). 
This removes the obstacle and we are able to develop a Gentzen style proof 
theory for L(a~) in Section 6. 
Let us begin by recalling what is meant by the phrase "alm6st all countable 
subsets s of M." Let Po,,(M) denote the set of all countable subsets of M. A set 
Xc P,,,(M) is unbounded if every so~ P,,,,(M) is a subset of some s~ X. X is closed 
if whenever s = U ...... s,, each s,, 6 X and s~, ~ s~ ~ • , .  ~;~: s~, ~ . . . .  then s <: X. A 
set X is cub if X is closed and unbounded. It is easy to check that the intersection 
of two cub sets is again cub. 
The cub filter on M (actually it's a filter on P,~,(M)) consists of .~hose X_~ 
P,o,(V/) which contain some cub subset Xo. This filter was introduced by Kueker 
[16], [17], and Jech [t2]. A property ~(s) of elements of Po,,(M) holds for ahnost 
al r countable s if {s 6 P,o,(M) I ~(s)} is in the cub filter. 
Kueker [17] Section 1.!c, has a nice description of the filter in terms of an 
infinite two person game. Namely, a set Xc_ P,o,(M) is in the cub filter on M iff 
Vxl e M ::ly I ~_ M Vx2 ~ M 3y2 c m. .  • {Xl, x2 . . . . .  Yl, Y2 . . . .  } ~_ X, 
where t~:. usual game-theoretic nterpretation is given to the infinite string of 
quantifiers. 
1.1, Lemma. The cub [ilter ~ or: P,.,,(M) has the following properties: 
(i) ~~ is a countably complete jilter, 
(ii) ~ is closed under diagonalization--i.e., if X ,e~ [or all a ~ M then the 
diagonal intersection {s I s ~ X,, f~r all a ~ s} is in q~, 
(iii) If M is countable then ~ = {X I M ~ X} so that in this case q~ is a principal 
filter, 
(iv) If M is uncountable then ~ ~s non-principal and is not an ultra[liter. (This last 
fact uses AC s~ron~,ly.) 
Proof, See Kueke: [17] or Jech [12]. IS] 
Kueker's diagonalization principle (ii) above is a generalization of the Fodor 
regressive function the<nero (cf. Kunen [18], for example) for the case of 
regressive functions on o~. The connection becomes clear when one notices ~.hat a 
set of countable ordinals is a cub set in the usual sense iff the set of all initial 
segments {/3 I/3 < c~} for o~ e X forms a cub in the sense used here. 
A set Y_  ,~,(M) is stationary if Yf-IX¢~ 0 for all X in the cub filter. Thus Y is 
stationary iff its complement ~ Y(= P~,,(M)- Y) is not in the cub filter. Note that 
the intersection X A Y of a cub set X and a stationary set Y is again stationary. 
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Given a countable first-order language L, expand it by adding countably many 
unary predicate variables s~, s2 . . . .  and a new quantifier a~. Formulas of L(az) are 
formed as usual with the new formation rule: if ~ is a [ormula o[ L(ac~) so is a~s q~ 
[or each predicate variable s. A sentence of L(a~) is a formula with no free 
individual variables or predicate variables. Note that while we allow Vx and :Ix 
we do not allow Vs or 3s as formation rules. That is, a~s is the only second-order 
quantifier allowed. We define stats  w(s) to be -aa~s -aq~(s); this is read as "there 
is a stationary set of countable sets s such that ~0(s)." The infinitary language 
L~,,,~(a~) is defined analogously. 
The meaning of formulas is defined in the obvious way. If ~0~ = (M, . . . )  is a 
structure for L and ,p(x~. ..  x,,, s t ' "  s,,) is a formula of L(az) then we define 
~.JY~q~(xl...x,, s~. . . s , , )  for all x~. . .x , ,~M,  s t " ' smEP~, , (M)  by induction 
with the crucial clause being: 
~a~s q~(s) iff ~q~(s )  for almost all countable s~_ M. 
1.2. Examples. (i) If ~ is countable then ~a~s ~o(s) iff ~0~q~(M) so that in this 
case the quantifier is trivial. 
(ii) We can define "there exist uncountably many x such that q~(x)" by the 
formula 
stats  3x (~o(x) A ~s(x)),  
so that L(az) contains L(Q), where Q means uncountable. We henceforth use 
Qx q~(x) for the above expression. We will use "L(Q)" to denote all translations 
into L(a~) of L(Q) formulas, plus subformulas of such translates. 
(iii) Let ~ = (M, ~)  where ~ is an equivalence relation. It is fairly well known, 
and not hard to check, that one cannot express the assertion that "~ has ~< Rt~ 
equivalence classes" in L(Q). It can be expressed in L(m) by 
,~s Vx 3y (x ~ y ^  s(y)). 
(iv) Let ~ = (M ¢, < . . . .  ) be a linear ordering. In L(Q) one can express that < is 
o~-like by the two axioms 
Ox (x = x), 
Vy-aOx (x < y). 
The following cannot be expressed as a sentence of L(Q) (or even X~ in L(Q)): 
• ~.s 3x Vy (s (y )~ <x) .  (*) 
This is equivalent o the existence of a sup-preserving function mapping (oJ~, <)  
cofinally into (M, <) .  (The proof that (*) is not ~ in L(Q) can be obtained from 
Keisler's proof of the Completeness Theorem for L(Q). You build an uncountable 
model ~ = (M, < . . . .  ) = U . . . .  ~)2,, in stages, using the proof of Keisler's Main 
Lemma to make sure that at each stage u, there is not a first new element in 
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(v) Makowsky and Shelah [19] introduce a logic L p°~ properly containing L(O) 
by the usual formation tales for -7, ^ ,  3x, Vx plus: if ~¢(s+) is a formula of U '°~ in 
which s occurs positively, then 3sq~(s+) is a formula of LP°L The dual rule is: if 
q~(s_) is a formula in which s occurs negatively then Vs ~0(s_) is a formula. The 
semantics is given by ~2~::ts ~0(s) if there is a countable set s such that ~ ~¢(s). 
This iogic is clearly a sublogic of L(a~) since, if q~(s+) is s-positive 
3s , (s )  o ,~s ,~(s); (**) 
for if q~(So) holds then q~(s) holds for all s ~ so. Thus, while we do not in general 
have the qu~,tifiers ::Is, Vs, we do have those instances of them which correspond 
to the above formation rules. We thus consider L ~"~ as a sublogic of L(a~.) by (**). 
(The sentence (*) in (iv) is also not in U"L) 
(vi) There is a sentence of L(az) not equivalent o any sentence ,'ff L~.  This 
sentence will be given m Section 5. 
(vii) Let ~, be a s~mtence of L .... (not L ..... (a~)) and write ~"~ for the result of 
relativizing all quan:ifiers in ~ to s. We can express one of Kueker's results in [17] 
in terms of m by the fact that q~ ~ a~s q/*) is valid; i.e., true in all models. That is, 
~ ~o iff ¢ holds in almost all countable substructures of ~ .  
(viii) This examT'.z comes from Eklof [8] and is included to show the relevance 
of the quantifier m for the theory of abelian groups. Let 7' be a torsion (abelian) 
group and let J be torsion free. If J is countable, then Baer's Theorem gives a 
necessary and sufficient condition that Ext (J, T )= 0, a condition that can be 
expressed in Lo,,,o. If we assume V = L then Eklof [8] proves that for !Jl~ N~, 
Ext (J, T) = 0 iff 
azs Ext (s, T) = O, 
azs ms '  (s' ___ s ~ Ext (s'/s, T) = 0), 
so that, for '~J[~<N1, Ext (J, T )= 0 is expressible in L ..... (a~). (We can assume that s 
raqges over subgroups of ] since almost every sub:~;et is a subgroup.) On the other 
hand, Eklof shows, again assuming V = L, that this is not expressible in L~,,. This 
shows that, assuming V = L, L .... (a~)¢: L~,,~, and is what suggested looking for a 
sentence as described in (vi) above. 
We now turn to the axioms and rules for L(,~). 
1.3. Definition. Let T be a set of sentences of Ix(m). The set of theorems of T in 
L(a~) is the smallest set containing all the usual axioms of first-order logic, 
containing all i.~iances of Axioms A0-A5 below, closed under the usual rules of 
modus ponens and generalization and closed under the rule of a~-generalization. 
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A0. a~si q~(s~) ,~ azsj ¢(sj); 
A I .  -la=s (false); 
A2. ~s(x~s) ,~s i ( s~s j )  (ig:j); 
A3. a~s q~ ^ a~s ~--* a~s (¢ ^  tp); 
A4 a=s (q~ --* d/)--'> (~s  q~ "~ a=s O); 
A5 ~'~ ~s  ~(x, s) ~ a~s Yx ~ s ~(x, s). 
Rule o ~ a~-generalization: If TI-TI--> q~(s) where s is not free in rl then TI-- 0 
Some comments on the axioms are in order. 
A0. Here it is assumed that ¢(s~) is a formula in which sj does not occur and 
q~(s i) is the result of replacing all free occurrences of si by s r These axioms insure 
that a~s really does bind the relation variable s. 
A1. Here (false) is some identically false proposition like :Ix (x ~ x). The effect 
of this axiom, with the others, is to allow us to prove (p ~, a~s (p whenever s is not 
free in ¢; see Lemma 2.4 below. 
A2. These axioms have free variables x, si respectively. The expression s~ c sj is 
shorthand for Vx (s~(x) --.* sj(x)). The axioms are sound, i.e., valid in all models for 
all x and all countable subsets si by the definition of the cub filter. 
A3, A4. These axioms are sound since the cub filter is indeed a filter. 
A5. This axiom is sound by the diagonal intersection property of the cub filter, 
see Lemma 1.1 (ii). Vxe  s q~ means Vx (s(x)---~ ~). 
Rule of a~-generalization. The rule preserves oundness; that is, if rl --~ ¢(s) is 
true in all models of T for all countable s, then so is rl --> ~s  q~(s). Recall here 
that T is a set of sentences o s is not free in T. It is not free in rl by the condition 
imposed by the rule. 
We say that T is consistent if it's not the case that TI- false. One of the main 
results of this paper is the following Completeness Theorem. We use the term 
"standard model"  below to emphasize that the model has the intended interpreta- 
tions of the second-order quantifiers a~, stat. 
1.4. Completeness Theorem for L(a=). A set T of sentences of L(a~) is cor,~istent 
iff T has a standard model. 
The proof of this will be given in Sectierl 3. 
The finitary nature of the rules immediately ield a Compactness Theorem. 
Recall that our basic language L(a=) is always countable. 
1.5, Compaetae~ Theorem ter L(a~). I f  T is a set ~f sentences of L(a~) and every 
finite subset ToE_ T has a standard model then T has a standard model. 
]Proof. Immediate from Theorem 1.4. [] 
17¢~ 1. Barwise, M. Kau[man ,~ ~d, Makkai 
The proof of the Completenes,, Theorem yields a model of power ~R1 so we 
get the following downward L6wenheim-Skolem Theorem. Clearly one can't do 
better since either Ox (x = x) or its negation might be in 7". 
1.6. Downward L6wenheim-Skotem Theorem for Liar,), A ny set T of sentences of 
L(az) which has a standard moaet has one of power at most R~. 
We now turn to L ...... (a~) and its countable fragments. A fragment La(a~) of 
L .... (a~) is defined as usual to be a set of formulas of L,,,,,,,(a~.) closed under 
subformtdas, substitutions and the finitary operations V, ^, -7, ~ ,  and the 
following: if At-:,o a~s~p~ is in L,~(~) so is A,.:,,, ~c, 
1.7. Definition. Let LA(a~) be a fragment of L ..... (o~) and let T be a set of 
sentences of LA(a~). The consequences of T form the smallest s~t of LA(aZ) 
formulas containing T, all the usual axioms for LA (as given in Section III. 4.1 of 
Barwise [2], e.g.), all La(o~) instances of Axioms A0-A5 above and Axiom A6 
below, and closed under the usual rules of modus ponens, generalization, infinit- 
ary conjunction and the rule of az-generalization given above. 
A6. Ai<~,~s ~,(s) ~ azs A,<,~q~(s). 
The Axiom A6 is valid since the cub filter is eountably complete. We say that T is 
consistent (with respect o LA(a~)) if false is not a consequence of T. 
1.8. Completeness Theorem for L .... (a~,). Let L,x(az) be a ccun*,able fragment of 
L ..... (,~) and lel 7' be a set of sentences of LA(a'~). T is consistent iff T has a 
standard model. 
Again the proof yields a model of power ~<1~i. 
The usual methods yield the appropriate completeness and compactness results 
for countable, admissible fragments LA(a~). The statements and proofs of these 
are completely anaiogous to the usual for LA. See, e.g., Section III.5 of Barwise 
[2]. 
There is an Omitting Types Theorem tor LA(ar,). It will be proved in Section 4. 
Theorem 1.8 will be a consequence of this Omitting Types Theorem. 
2. Some formal consequences of the axioms and rules 
In the next section we will be working with cer:ain "weak" models of the 
axioms and rules. We thus need to get a better feeling for some of the formal 
consequences of the axioms and rules since these will hold in all weak models. 
The reader might want to skip ahead to Section 3 and then come back to pick up 
anything actually needed from this section. The lemmas of this section will apply 
~.o L(a~) oi" any other fragment LA(~). We fi^ a theor'y T and write t-q~ for TFq~ 
below 
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2.1. Lemma. l f  t-q~(s)--~ 4'(s)then ~-a~sq~(s)---*azs4'(s). 
Proof .  Apply n~-generalization to obtain a~s (q~--* 4') and then use Axiom A4 
and modus ponens. [] 
2.2. Lemma. l[ F~(s)- -*4'(s)then 1-stats~o(s)-->stats4'(s). 
Proof .  Apply contraposition, then Lemma 2.1, then take contrapositives again to 
obtain k ~Ta~s "-~#--~ -~azs-74' which is the desired conclusion. [] 
2.3. Lemma. I f  Fq~(s)--~ rl where s is not free in rt then F stat sq~(s)-* ~. 
ProofY Similar to Lemma 2.2. [] 
2.4. Lemma. I¢ s is not free in q~ then F q~ ~ a~s ~. 
Proof. The implication I-~--~ a,zs~ follows directly by ~-generalizat~on. By 
propositional logic, F-lq~ --> (~p --> false), so, by a~-generalization, ~--7q~---> 
ar~s(q~--~false). Using Axiom A4 and modus ponens we obtain F~q~--, 
(t~s ~-~ a~s (false)). But F-7a~s (false) by Axiom A2, so, by propositional logic 
we obtain t--'7 ~ --~ -~a~s q~ or, taking contrapositives, the desired conclusion. [] 
2.5. Lemma. Let 4'~ be a formula of the form stat s t ' "  stat s, q~ and let 4'2 be 
stat s~ • . ,  stats, stat t~ • • • stat tk ~ly~ • • • 3yk ~, where the t~ and y~ are notfree in q~o 
Then ~- 'lJl ~'> q~2. 
Proof. I- (~ <--> :ty q~) so, by Lemma 2.4 applied k times, I- (q~ ~ stat t ,:Sly q~). Then., 
applying Lemma 2.2 n times, we get I-q4 ~ 4'z- [] 
We now become even more informal in our proofs, leaving it to the reader to 
convince himself that they can be formalized. 
2.6.  Lemma.  I- a~s q~ ^  stat s 4' --~ stat s (~ A ¢) .  
P roo f .  We assume a~s,p and -~stat s (q~ ^  +) and prove -Tstat s 4'- In other sym- 
bols, we assume a~s~ and a~s -l (¢ ^  4') and prove a~s 74'. Since 
1- (~ ^ -7(~p^ 4')---> 74')  we have 
I-ms (~ ^  -'1(~0 ^ 4'))--, ~s  -74,. 
But also 
t- a~s ~ A a~S -7(,¢ ^  4') ---> mS (,~ ^  7 (~ A 4')) 
by A3, so, by modus ponens, we get i-ms-74'. []  
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2.7. LemmL I f  s is not free in ~ then k ~ ^  s ta ts  t~ --, s ta ts  (~0 ^  t~). 
Proof.  Combine Lemmas 2.4 and 2.6. [ ]  
2.8. Lemma. k ~s  ~(s) --> stat s ~o(s). 
Proof.  Apply  Lemma 2.6 with ~b the formula 7(false) and use Axiom A I  and 
Lemma 2.2. O 
2.9. Lemma. I-Vx a~s ~(x, s) o a~s Vx ~ s ~(x, s). 
Proof.  The ---, half is Axiom A5. To prove <--, assume ~s  ~/x c s q~(x, s). Pick 
any x. By Axiom A2, azs (x~ s). By Axiom A3, a~s (x ~ s AVx C s~p(x, s)). But 
t- x ~ s ^ Vx  ~ s ~,(x, s) --, ~(x, s), 
so by Lemma 2.1 and modus ponens we obtain msq~(x,s).  Thus 
Vx a~s~(x,  s). [] 
2.10. Lerama. ~3xz " • • 3xk stat s~. • • s tats .  ¢ ~ stat s~ •. • s tats .  3x~ •. • 3xk ~. 
Proof.  By inductio~,~ on k + n. Let us check the basic manipulation 
3x stats  q~ --~ stats  3x q~. 
Assum~ 3x star s~o, i.e. 7Vx ~s  7q~. Then by Lemma 2.9, 
7azs  Vx~_s 7q~ 
which is stat s qx ~ s ~ By Lemma 2.2 we get star s 3x ~. 
These lemmas are what will be l,~eded in the proofs in Sections 3 and 4. The 
rest of this section is taken up with investigating the role of Axiom A5 in deriving 
the crucial axiom of Keisler [15] mentioned in the introduction. Notice that in 
standard models, 3:~ox q~(x) is equivalent o stat s (~ c_ s), i.e,, to 
s tats  Vx (~(x) -~ s(x)), 
so that Oxtg(x) is equivalent o ~sZlxC_s~o(x). On the other hand, we have 
defined Qx~(x)  by s ta ts3xes~(x) ,  so we should be able to prove these 
equivalent. 
2.11. Lemma. I f  J is not free in ~p(x) then 
l- a~s 3x¢ s q~(x) ~ stat s 3x¢ s q~(x). 
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PROM, The implication --* follows from Lemma 2.8. To prove the converse we 
argue as follows to prove the contrapositive: 
stat s (9  c_ s) ~ a~s (~ c_ s). 
Fix So, s two distinct variables. We have F q~ c_ so ~ q~ _ so so, by a~-generalization, 
I- q~ c_ so---~ ms (~: c_ so). We also have I- ms (So_C s) by Axiom A2. Thus, by Axiom 
A3 and modus ponens we have 
F (~ c_ so ~ ~s  (~ __ So^ So__- s)). 
But b(cpc_s~c_s--~q~c_s), o by Lemma 2.1, Fcpc_so-->a~s(tp~s). Now apply 
Lemma 2.3 and Axiom A0 to obtain 
I- stat s (q~ c_ s) ~ ,a~s (q~ ~_ s). [ ]  
We now c~,me to the proof of the crucial axiom from Keisler regarding ISI, or 
rather, its contrapositive. 
2.12.  Lemma.  I -Yx ::t~Soy q~(x, y )^3~ox3y ¢(x, y)-->3~,,y3x tp(x, y). 
Proof. We take 3~"x ~b(x)to be given by a~s (0c  s). The first cenjunct of the 
hypothesis gives (1), the second gives (2), below. 
¥x ,~s Vy (~(x, y )~ y~ s, (1) 
a~s Vx (3y q~(x, y) --~ x ~ s). (2) 
From (1) and Axiom A5 we obtain 
a,~s Vx ~ s Vy (~p(x, y) --~ y ~ s), (3) 
which, taken with (2) and Axiom A3 gives 
~s  [¥x ~ s ¥y (,~(x, y) ~ y ~ s) ^ ¥x  (3y ~(x, y) ~ x ~ s)]. (4) 
The part of (4) in brackets implies Vy (::Ix ~(x, y)--~ y e s) so (4) itself implies 
a~s Vy (3x ¢~(x, y) --~ y ~ s) which is 
3~'~y 3x ~(x, y) 
as desired. [] 
The proof shows the crucial role of Axiom A5. (We'll see later that a weaker 
form will suffice.) It will play a pivotal role in the proof of the Cc, mpleteness 
Theorem. 
Finally, for moral support, we state one last trivial fact. It explains why we do 
not need to make our weak models extensional in what follows. 
2:,13. Lemma, If s i does not occ'tr in ~p(s~) then 
I- Vx (s,(x) ~ s~(x)) --, (,p(s3 ",-" ~(s?). 
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Proof. This is proved by induction on formulas. Assume, e.g., that the result is 
trae of O(s~, ) and ~(si, s) and let q~(si) be a~s g,(s,, s). Assume Vx [si(x) ~ st(x)]. 
Then 4,(s, s) ~ ~O(s,, s), so, by ~-generalization we have a~s [~0(s~, s) *-~ 4s(s i, s)]. 
This, with Axiom A4, gives 
,~s  ~(s~, s) ,--, ,~s  q,(s# s),  
as desired. [] 
3. Weak models :tad the ComFleteness Theorem for L(m), 
The proof of the Completeness Theorem given below follows in outline that of 
Keisler [15] for L(O). We first define a notion of weak model for L(a~). Next, we 
prove a weak completeness theorem which shows that every consistent heory 
has a weak model. We then prove our main lemma, which allows us to extend 
weak models. A suitable iteration of the main lemrna o~ times finishes the proof. 
The main differences in the proof from that of Keisler for L(O) lie in the much 
stronger conclusion of our main !.emma and the additional care needed in the 
iteration of the main Lemma. 
For each formula ~0(x, :;, ¢) of L(n~), where x is the sequence of first-order 
variables in q~, and s, t is the sequence of second-order variables in q~, let R,~ ¢ be 
a new relation symbol with argumt.nts x and t. Actuaily~ it is desirable to exercise 
a certain amount of caution when introducing the R,.,~; see Section 3.9 for 
details. In our weak models, we hope t:~ recapture properties of the a~s quantifier 
with first-order formulas involving the new and old atomic formulas. This device 
was applied by Ressayre [23] in his study of the language L(O). Keisler's weak 
models in Keisler [15] are of a different nature, and their equivalents in our 
context are what we will call cub-like models; see Section 8.2. 
We consider first-order, two-sorted structures of the form 
where ~Jl = (Mr. . . )  is a structure for L and e is a subset of M x P (so that P i:~ 
essentially a collection of subsets of M, with possible repetition). The language of 
~.~* is the two*sorted language having two sorts of variables called "first-order" 
and "second-order", respectively. The first-order variables range over the set M, 
tile second-order ones over the set 1~ The non-logical symbols of this language 
are those of L, the places of which are all first-order; the symbol E, the first place 
of which is fiirst-order, the second second-order, and the symbols R,~,,p for 
q~ ~ L(aM, with the "sorting" of places explained above. 
Each formula p of L(a~) has a counterpart q~* in the new language. This 
operation * is defined inductively by: (s(x))* = (x e s), ¢¢* = q~ for other atomic q~, * 
commutes with everything except a~s and (a,s q))*= R,~.~ ,. 
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Thus we can define satisfaction of L(a~) formulas ¢ with parameters a in ~*  
by: ~*i=q~(a) iff ~2*~q~*(a), where the latter is just the first-order notion of 
satisfaction. 
3.1. Definition. A weak model for L(a~) is a model 
(as abe,re) with the following properties: all instances of the axioms of L (~)  are 
true ir~ ~JR*; and whenever ~*  ~ ¢(t) for all te  P, then ~*  ~o~s q~(s). (Here ~0 may 
have parameters in M U P.) 
A word on this definition. The latter condition is just saying that the m-  
generalization rule is valid in ~l~*. Since (by Axiom A1) Pc= 0, the latter condition 
can also be thought of as saying that stationary sets are non-empty. In any case, 
pro,~ability is sound with respect o weak models: if ~lI~* is a weak model, ~*  ~: 7; 
and T F 0 then ~*  ~ 0 for any interpretation of the free variables in 0. 
A countable weak model ~2" is one where both M and P~" are countable. 
(Here, and from now on, we assume that 
Given a set S of first- and second-order constants, let K = L U S. We will need 
to coesider the corresponding expansion K(a~) of L(a~). 
A weak model for such a language would look like (~[R*, a~*)~s . The axioms 
and rules of inference for K(a~) include all instances of substituting first- and 
second-oMer coastants for first- and second-order variables (respectively) in the 
axioms and rule, of L(m). If T is a theory in such an expansion K(a~), we say T is 
consistent if it's consistent with the axioms and r~ies for K(a~). 
3.2. Lemma. (Weak Completeness Theorem for L(,~)). Let T be a set of sentences 
of K(a~), an expansion of L(a~) by at most countably many constants (and possibly 
none). If T is consistent then there is a countable weak model ~1~* of T. (That is, 
~J~* ~ ~o for all ~o ~ T.) 
Proof. We expand our language, adding first- and second-order witnessing con- 
stants. Let C = {c,: n ~ to} and U = {u,,: n 6 to} be sets e f first- and second-order 
constants (respectively) disjoint from K(a~). Let (K(ar,))' be all sentences obtained 
from formulas of K(a~) by replacing free variables x~ by q and s~ by u~. We will 
define by induction on n a finite set T, of sentences of (K(aa))' and a number k,,. 
Our inductive hypotheses are as follows. 
(1) i<j<~n--> T,c_ T k 
(2) If q or u occurs in a sentence of T., then i<~k,. 
(3) T U {stat u~stat u l • "" stat uko 3Co 3cl • • .3%,  ^  T,(u, c)} is consistent 
(.where here we abuse notation by regarding the q and u~ as variables). 
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Our goal is to construct he sets "F. so that we can build the desired model in the 
usual fashion from L J, ...... T., out of the c~, u. and any second-order constants of 
K(~). 
Let (~,,(e", u" ) ) .~  be an enumeration of the sentences of (K(az))'. We define 
7". ar!d k., assuming that T.._~ and k._~ have been defined. (First, set T_~ =1~, 
k ~=0.) 
Let k. =sup{k._~, i :6 or u~ occurs in ~,,}+ 1. If 
stat(u~ : i < k.) 3(ci :i < k.) (t, T~_1 ^  ~,,(e ~', u'~)) 
is not consistent with T, then by inductive hypothesis 3, Lemma 2.5, and Axiom 
A3, 
stat(u, :i ~ k.) 3(c~ :i ~ k.) (^ T._~ ^  -7 q~,,(e '~, u")) 
is consistent with T; so we can let 7., = 7.,.~ U{- i~.(e",  u")}, and the inductive 
hypotheses are preserved, Otherwi,~;c, let 
7 , , -  T._, U {q~.(e'", u")}. 
To get T. from T~, ~, we sorer:times add witnesses. If ~p,, is =ix ~k for some ~/~, let 
T,, = ~',U {~b(e", u", c j} .  
If q~,, is stat s ¢(s) ,  let 
T,, = T,°,U {~(c ", u", uk.)}. 
Otherwise, let T. = T'. ~. In any case, i* is easy to see that the inductive hypotheses 
are preserved. For example, if q~,, is stat s ~(s), then by construction and Lemma 
2.5, 
stat(u~ :i < k.) 3(c~:i < k,,) (A T~.~ ^stats ~(s)) 
is consistent with T; therefore, by at~plying 11:mmas 2,7 and 2.10, A~iorn A0, and 
then Lemma 2.5, we have 
stat(ui : ~ k,~) ~l(c, :i ~ k,,) (^ "P.~A O(uk.)) 
is consistent with T, as desired. 
The induction is complete. Let 7~ = I_J,, 7",,; note that 7L :~ T. We construct a 
weak model ~2}2" in a manner similar to that employed in usual Henkin construc- 
tions. Define an equivalence relation -~ on the elements of C by: c~-~c~ iff 
"q  = cj"~ T~. Then 
M= {6/~ :i~ to}. 
Set P~?'J~" ={~ : i < ~9} U {u : u is a second-order constant of K(a~)}. (The latter set in 
the definition of P~* has no counterpart in tt~e definition of M becau~;e its 
analogut is not needed there: ~ ::Ix (x = c) for any first-order c~ K, and we added 
witnesses in our construction.) Define ~a"" by: 
c~/~ e~*u iff "u (c J "e  T~; 
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the equality axioms of first-order logic insure that e ~t* is well-defined. Define the 
other relations on ~02" as follows. For R ~ L, define R~(c/~) iff R(¢) ~ T,~ (or, if 
as suggested in Section 8.2 below, relations between first- and second-order 
objects are allowed in L, R~(u,  c /~ ) iff R(u, c) e ]~). Also, define 
Rz~* 
,~(u ,c / - )  iff ~s~(s.u,c)eT~. 
Again, the~e are well-defined statemen,s. Functions on ~ are defined similarly. 
We now establish for q~ in (K(ae))', by.induction on the complexity of q~* (not 
of), that 
~),R~(u, el ,.,-) if[ ~(n,c)~T~ (1) 
for all sequences u from U, e from C. When ~o* is atomic it's true by definition. 
For ~0=-ntk, (~)  is by con:pleteness of T~, and (=),) is by consistency of T~ 
(which follows from the third inductive hypothesis). The case ~O = 0~ v ~2 is also 
easy to check, as is the (~:)  direction of the case ~p =3x g,, using the c~nsistency 
and completeness of T~. Finally, if 3x t )E  T~, then ~b(c)~ T~ for some c (by 
construction of T~), so by the inductive hypothesis ~IR* g ~b(c/-) and thus ~*  
:Ix q~, as desired. Note that the case ~0 = a~s qJ was taken care of at the atomic 
stage. 
What remains is to show that ~]R* is a weak model. Since T~ is consistent (with 
all the axioms cf (K(m))'),  we know by (1) above that ~]R* satisfies all instances of 
the axioms of L(a,) except possibly those in which there are free second-order 
variables. Consider, for example, the following instance of Axiom A2: azs (uk c 
s). Let n ~ to be such that a~s (Uk C S) i~ q~,. NOW F" a~t ntiS (t c s), so at stage n we 
could add ms (uu c s) to T,_~, by Lemma 2.6. So by construction, we did add it, 
and by (1), TR*~a~s(u~s). More generally, a similar argument shows that 
whenever T proves a sentence 
a~So a~s~ • • • azs,~ VxoV x~ • • " Vx,, ~0, 
then 
~J~*~q)(uk,,, Uk . . . . . .  U~,X) foral l  ko<k~< ""  <kin. 
Thus, since F a~sVx,O for each axiom q~, for every ordering s of the free 
second-order variables in q~, all instances of the axioms are true in ~d*. 
Finally, we show that whenever ~*  N stats @(s), there is a k such that ,~* 
q~(u~). This follows because witnesses were added in such cases; in fact, if 
stat sq~(s) is q~,, then we can take k to be k,. [] 
To state the main lemma we need the following Definition 3.3 (i). As usual, 
the point of introducing the notion of elementary submodel is to get something 
preserved under unions, so we also define this in Definition 3.300. 
3.3. Degniflons. (i) Let ~R* and 92* be two weak models for L(a~). We say that 
92* is an L(,~) elementary extension of ~*  and write ~R* <92*(wrt L(a~)) if 
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2~* c ~t~* (as first-order structures), and for every L(a~) formula ,~, with p~rameters 
from M U P ~*, ~*  ~ q~ iff ~l~*~0. 
(ii) Let (~* :  a < 3') be an elementary chain of weak models: a </3 < 3~ ~ g~2* < 
~ (wrt L(a~)). The union ~*= U . . . . .  is defined to be the usual first-order 
union. 
One should check that if (~0~,* : o < 3') is an elementary chain of weak models for 
L(~)  with union ~ff~*, then ~*<~* (wrt L(~))  for all a <7,  and that therefore 
~i'.* is also a weak model for L(n~). This is a routine proof by induction on 
formulas. 
We can now state the main result needed for the proof (~f the Completeness 
Theorem for L(a~). 
3.g. Theorem (Main Lemma). Let ~,~I~* be a countable weak model for L(az) and 
let stats to(s) be some formula of L(a~) (with parameters [rom MU P~')  which is 
true in ~* .  There is a countable weak model ~* with the following properties: 
(i) ~*  < ~/~* (wrt L(~));  
(ii) M c P~*; that is, foi some so~ P ~*, {x ~ N : ~l~* ~ x c so} = M (so that from 
now on we'll identify so and M); 
(iii) ~* ~ t0(M); 
(iv) ]'or all formulas (with para~neters) azs~p(s) true in ~* ,  ~JU:~ ,p(M): and 
(v) ]'or every s E P~*, the extension oj" s in 92* is the same as that it~ ~* ,  i.e., ].or 
all x~N,  ~l~*~ x~s  iff x~M and ~)~*~ x~ s. 
ProeL Let K(a,) be the result of expanding LG~) by adding a first-o,'der constant 
m for each m ~ M, a second-order constant rh for each s ~ P~*'*, and .an additional 
second-order constant symbol .M. Let To be the set of all K(a~) sentences true in 
~JU (where ~ is interpreted by m, g is interpreted by s, and no truth value is 
assigned to sentences in which/Q oo:urs). Let T be ]'o together with the fo!!owing 
sentences of K(az): 
(2) ~(/VI), whenever ~g~* ~ a~s q~(s). 
The roles of (1) and (2) are respectively to insure (iii) and (iv) in the statement of 
the theorem. Also, from (2) we get that for each m 6 M, "nq ~ A,TF'6 T, and for 
each so~P 'vr~, "goc/ f ' / "e  T. so that (v) will hold. (Actually (v) follows from 
(i)-(iv).) To insure (ii) we need a model of T plus Vxv~L(x) where .X(x) is 
{-~ ff4(X), x = ~fi :m e M}. 
Ar~y weak model of T+VxvZ(x)  will prove the theoiem. 
We first prove the following "consistency criterion": for any sentence 0(tQ). 
T ~- O(,~t) iff ~r~, ~ ,~s (to(s) -~ O(s)). (,) 
To prove ((=), suppose T}~* ~ ~zs (to(s)--~ O(s)). Then to(AT/)--. O(l~'/) is in T and 
so is to(/V/), so 7" i -0(M) .  
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To pro~e (~) ,  suppose T~-0(A4). There are a finite number of sentences of 
forms (1) and (2) above, say $(~7l), ~o~(AT/) . . . .  , ~k(/XT/), such that To together with 
these proves 0(AT/). We can write this as 
To k A¢,(A71) --+ (t~(P~/) --~ 0(~/)). 
We can replace M by a second-order variable s and then apply Lemma 2.1 to get 
To F azs(Aq~,(s)) - - a~s (tp(s) ~;, O(s)), 
so this must be true in s~j~* since ~./~* is a weak model of To. Since ~0~* ~ a~s q~,(s) 
for each ~, it follows that 
~* ~ ~.s (~(s) --, O(s)), 
and (*) holds. Note that since 
~*  ~ - t~s  (¢(s) ~ -, g,(s)) 
(because ~.g~* b-7azs 7¢(s)) ,  we have that T does not prove 70(^4) - - so  T is 
consistent. Note also the contrapositive of (*): 
T+~c(M) is consistent iff ~g~* gstat s (~¢(s)^tb(s)). (**) 
Wc are now ready to build a model ~* of T plus Vx v X(x). The construction is
exactly the proof of the weak completeness theorem (3.2) except for one 
additional step. After completing all the steps required to get T~ from T,,_~, we 
add one more. We want to guarantee, for each n, that if c, /~ winds up in AT/, then 
c, /~ -- tfi for some m ~ M. Let ¢ be the sequence co, c~, . . . ,  c~_~, c ,÷~, . . . ,  ck.. 
Let T~, represent he version of T, we have obtained from "F,,_~ so far (as 
before). Thus 
stat u 3c , ,  : te^ ~ • T,,(c., c, u, 2(4) 
is consistent with T (where we suppress the parameters from MU P~*). By the 
consistency criterion (**), 
~*  ~ stat s (stat u 3c~ q¢ ^  T:,(c~, e, u, s)^ $(s)). (1) 
Now if there is an m eM such that 
~*  ~stat s (stat u :~e^ T~,(m, e, ~, s)^$(s)) ,  
let T, = T~,U{c,, = r~l}; then using (**) we see that the inductive hypotheses are 
preserved, at~d c,,/,~ = m in the resulting model ~ since "c~ = rh",s T~. Other- 
wise, there is no such m ~ M; so 
T,,(x, c, ~, s)). 
Thus we have, by several uses of the axiom A5 (which we haven't used till now) 
~*~a~s(t~(s) - - -~maVxV¢(  A x6u ,^xes - - -~TAT~(x ,e ,u ,s ) ) ) .  (2) 
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Also, t- ~u~ (s ~ u~) for all i, so by Lemma 2.5, t- a~ (s c.:- u~) lor all i, and thus (by 
Axiom A4) ~" a~u /~.~,, s ~ ui; so 
~'a~S,a~U A scu i  
by ~ generalization. Thus 
~* t: ,~s  ,~u A s c u~. (3)  
Taking (2) and (3) together and using Axiom A4 and then Lemma 2,1 and modus 
ponens, we have 
fl)~* I: a~s (O(s) "-* a~U Vx Ve (^ T],(x, e, u, s) --~ -nx ~. s)). (4) 
Using Lemma 2.6 on (1) and (4) (as well as Lemma 2.2 and modus ponens), we 
obtain 
~J~* ~ stats stat u :Ix :qe ( ^  T~(x, e. u, s) ^ -nx e s ^  q~(s)). (5) 
Thus we can let T.=T~U{'-nc.e.~74}; (5) and the consistency criterion (**) 
guarantee that the inductive hypotheses are preserved. Also, since (c.¢/~7/)e T., 
we have (c.¢ M)e T~ so that when we're done, 92* e -n (c . / -e  tffl). 
Thus in any case, for al! n ~ ~o~ 92* ~ vE(c,,/~), as desired. This completes the 
proof of the main lemma. [] 
The Completeness Theorem for L(a0 (1.4) follows immediately from the weak 
completeness theorem and the following result. For any standard model 92, let 
92* denote lhe corresponding weak model 
, R ~* , R 'J~ ~ where =.~ta) itt92~o~s~o(s,a). (92, P~,(N), e , . ,  
Note that for any q~ of L,~=) with parameters in N i3 P~,~(N), 92 ~ q~ itt 92* ~ q~*. 
3.5. Theorem. Let ~02" be a countable weak model for L(a~). Let stats ~(s) be 
some [ormula true in ?i)~*. There is a model 92 for L so that the corresponding weak 
model 92* has the .following properties: 
(i) 9YU <92'  wrt L(a~), 
(ii) 92* ~ qJ(M), 
(iii) ~* ~ ¢(M) ]or all formulas a~s q~(s) true in ~Y~*. 
Proof .  Let C be a set of a>~ constant symbols, P a set of ¢ol unary relation 
symbols. There are ~,~ scnter~ces of L(m) allowiv 3 symbols from CUP of the 
form stat sO(s). Let I be the set of all such. Partition to~ into to~ disjoint 
stationary sets (stationary in the usual sense), to1 = [.J,~Si. It is well known that 
this is possible, see e.g. Kunen [18]. We define a sequence (s2lq*; a <¢ol) of weak 
models for L(m). Let ~ff~* = ~R*, and choose names for everything in Mo from C, 
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in pa~,, from P. For limit A let ~*= O~<~$Y{*. For c~+ 1, apply the main lemma 
(3.4) to ~*  and the unique formula stats t0(s) such that c~ c S~,~t, , if stats t0(s) is 
defined and true in ~ * , ,  to define g * * ~ff~+t. (Otherwise let =~* . )  Choose 
names for everything in M~+t from (7, everything in P'~:*, from P. Let ~+= 
U,~<,o,~0~*, and let 92 be the L-reduct of 92+. For every s ~ pro*, we have that 
s~p~no" for some a<cot ,  and by part (v) of the main lemma, the extension 
{x E N : 92+ k x E s} of s in ~+ (also denoted by s) is the same as the extension of s 
in ~ *. _,R~, in particular the extension of s is a countable subset of N. Also, by part (it) 
of tL main lemma, there is a constant /~,, ~ P~=., whose extension in ~*~,  and 
hence in ~,  is M,,, the first-order universe of ~¢*. ~+ is a weak model satisfying 
(i)-(iii) above, but it is not ~*. We need to verify that for all formulas ¢¢ of 
L(~t), for all a~ N U P~,  92+V¢(a) in the sense of weak models iff 92"~¢(a) in 
the standard sense. This is by induction on formulas, the only non-trivial step 
being: 
92 ~ ~ a~s ,¢(s) iff 92* ~ a~s ~o(s). 
Fo prove (:=>), note that if 92+~a~s~p(s) then ~+ k ~p(M~) for all o~>ao, some 
ao<tOl. The set {M,~[a>ao} is a cub subset of P,o,(N). By the induction 
hypothesis, 92* ~ ~o(M,) for all ct > so so 92* k a~s ~p(s). 
To prove ((=), assume ~* ka~s~0(s). Hence there is a cub set Y~_ P,o,(N) such 
that for every s ~ Y~, ~* ~ tp(s). But Y2 = {M~ [ ~x < or} is cub so Y~ ~ Y2 is cub. 
Thus the set {a <to~ [92"~ ¢(M~)} contains a cub set X(= Y i~ Y2) of ordinals. 
Now, toward a contradiction, suppose 92+~ stats-a¢(s).  Let a~,< to~ be chosen so 
that all parameters in ~p are in ~o,  and let S={a>Cto[a~S,t~t~ ,}. Then 
92+~ -atp(M,) for all a ~ S. The stationary set S and the cub set X must have 
some ordinal a in common. For this a, 92* ~ ~¢(M~), ~+~ -,~p(M~), which con- 
tradicts the inductive hypothesis. 
This proves conditions ~i) and (iii) of the theorem. To ensure (ii), we need only 
make sure, when we partition w~ into the S~, that O~S~t~t~,. [] 
3.6. Remark. What happens if -~Qx (x = x) is in our original theory T? Then the 
weak model ~*  which starts our col-chain of models will satisfy ~Qx (x = x), i.e., 
a~s Vx (xes). Applying the main lemma yiells ~0~*, which must then satisfy 
Vx (xe Mo); thus Ml = Mo. It's clear then that ?~, = Mo for all ~, so that N= Mo 
as well. Thus our final (standard) model of T is countable, as it should be. The 
point is that although new countable subsets may be added to P~o* to get pS~C+,, 
no new elements are added to Me. 
On the other hand, if Qx(x=x) is in T, then each M,~a~s3x(xCs); so 
s.Ll~,~+l ~ =Ix (x~ M~). That is, at least one new element has been added to ~'~. to get 
M,+~. Therefore N is really uncountable. 
3.7. Remark, Our proof of completeness shows a little more than we stated. 
Namely, if T is a theory and ,p(s) is a formula, which may have free variables, 
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then T t- .~ iff for all models ~l of T, ~ satisfies ¢ for all sequences  of countable 
subsets cf M. 
The pr~)d also shows (see especially the proof of Lemma 3.2) that the following 
set of axioms is complete for L(a~,): {a~sVxq~:,,0 is one of the axioms of A0 
through A5 or of first-order logic, and all the free variables of ~o are included in 
s U x}U {~ ~, a~:~ q~:s is not free in q~}. Since any proof in this modified axiom 
system involves only sentences, the rule of a~-generalization is oot necessary in 
this system. 
3.8. Remark.  Our proofs of the weak completeness theorem arid tl~e mail~ 
lemma eat~ be m()dified to work for the following expanded version of L(a~): 
allow existential (and universal) second-order quantification in the formation 
rules. The Elementary Chain Theorem in 3.3 is also still true. (However, the proof 
in Theorem 3.5 would give a standard model which is still an elementary 
extension only for the formulas of our usual notion of L(a~).) This remark can 
be used in Kaufmann's proof that interpolation fails in L(az), a result of Shelah 
discus~;ed in Remark 6.9. 
3.9. Remark.  The converse of the weak completeness theorem is true. To see  
this, one st:ows that if T I- ~ and ~R* is a weak model of T thet~ ~JJ~* ~ q~, that is, 
~*  ~ q~*. There are some subtleties in showing this, though. One way of avoiding 
the subtleties is to define the R,,~ ~ in sucl~ a way that we can show the following: 
if t/J is obtained from ~ by (proper) substitution, thcn the same substitution in ,¢* 
gives ~b*. This property seems nice in its; ~wn right, and simplifies some other 
verifications in our proofs. 
We have the following arrangement to ensnare this property. Call (temporarily) a
formula w e L(a~) free if it does not contain (individual) constants and if no 
variable has two distinct free occurrences in q~. Call two free formulas equivalent if 
one is obtained from the other by a substitution. Now, it is clear that any formula 
qJ ~ L (~)  (possibly containing constants) is obtained by a substitution from a free 
formula ,~,~, c: ~led the skeleton of t~; q~ is determined by ~k up to equivalence and 
the substituti~ n is uniquely determined by ~ and q~. With every equivalence class 
[,p] of free ormalas ,  we associate a new relation symbol R , ;  for distinct 
equivalence ~,lasse% the R,  are distinct, but R,~ = R,~, whenever q) and ~' are 
equivalent free fo:mulas. With k and l the numbers of first-order and second- 
order free variablc,s in if,, respectively, we let R, be a k -~-/-place relation symbol 
in which the first k places are (to be filled in by) ]irst-order (variables or constants) 
and the last l places are second-order. In other words, we are dealing with a 
-!wo-sorted hmguage, with two so,'ts of variables. 
If azs,¢ is any formula in L(a~) starting with an ~s  quantifier, R,=,~, denotes 
R,=~,p,, where a~s ~o is the skeleton of a~s ~o. Given n~s q), we define (a~s ~0)* to be 
R . . . .  (x, t) where ,,as ¢ = (~s  U~o)(X, t) fc, r the skeleton ~s  ~¢~ of ~s  ~, and for t 
the k- and l-tuples of first- and second-order variables or constants, respectively, 
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whose substitution in the given order in a~s q~o yields a~s ~¢. In particular, a~s q~ 
and (ms,c)* have the same free variables and constants. 
Notice that whenever q~L(a~) is an instance of a valid first-order axiom 
scheme, then q~* is an instance of the same scheme (hence in particalar, it is 
valid). This is so essentially because now * "respects ubstitution" in the obvious 
sense. Now it is clear that our notion of satisfaction "~Y~* ~ ~¢(a)", ~0 e L(a~), obeys 
all the laws of first-order logic, which was the aim of our somewhat formalistie 
procedure. 
3.10. Remark. It is useful to see what azst a~s2 "• • a~s,~ q~ raeans in the model 
constructed in Theorem 3.5. For example, suppose a~st a~s2 azs3 ~¢ is a ser, tence 
of L(o~) with parameters in ~))2",. Then 
~J~ ~a~sl a~s2 a~s3 q3(sl, s2, s3) iff ~q~(M~,,  M~, MJ  
Whenever ao < a~ < a2 < a3 < to~. 
This observation may be helpful in understanding Section 4. 
4. Omitting types in LA(~) 
In this section we prove an Omitting Types Theorem which is similar to the one 
in Keisler [15] (4.9), but is to some extent a second-order theorem. Out of this 
will come the completeness of the axioms and rules for L,ol~,(a~). 
We've already done an omitting types argument. The "M-type"  E(x) in the 
main lemma (more precisely, {-ntr(x)[ o,~X(x)}) had to be omitted. The use of 
the diagonal intersection axiom A5 in that argument illustrates much of the idea 
behind the proof of the Omitting Types Theorem in this section. 
What we want is a useful sufficient condition for a theory T to have a model of 
some sentence of the form '¢x V . . . .  ~cr,,(X), or a~sV,,<,o-Ttr,,(s), or say 
a~s a~tVx V,, ~r,l(x, s, t). Note while reading the following that the omitting 
types condition for the latter is different than the one for a~tazsVx V ,  
~cr,(x, s, t). Let's look first at the first-order case. Fix a countable fragment 
LA(a~). We want a notion of "strongly omits" similar to that of Keisler [15]. Let 
T be a set of sentences of LA(a~), and let X(x) be a set of formulas of LA(a~) in 
the finite string x of variables. Let's say that T strongly omits E if whenever a 
sentence stats3xq~(x,s) is consistent with T, there is a cr~X such that 
s~at s ::Ix (q~(x, s)^ mo~(x)) is consistent with T. 
Omitting Types Theorem (first-order version). Let T be a set o[ sentences, and 
E(x) a set of formulas, of LA(~). Suppose that T strongly omits Z. Then T has a 
(standard) model ~ which omits X,; that is, ~ ~ Vx V~x~o' (x ) .  
Since cur notion of strongly omits uses the syntactic definition of consistent, he 
Completeness Theorem is a special case of the above. 
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It might be instructive for the reader to prove the above before we prove the 
full Omittir~g Types Theorem, where we'll consider sets ~(x~ . . . .  , x,,, fi . . . . .  t,,) 
of forr~mlas (where the x~ and t t are first- and second-order variables, respec- 
tively). F~x such a set ~(x, tt of formulas of LA(a,). We'll use the symbol S~ to 
range ~,~ver strings of quantifiers resulting from the string stat q stat t2 • • • stat t,,, 
by inserting any number of distinct quantifiers star s~. More formally, S~ can 
represent any string of the form 
stat sl~ stat s~.  • • • s ta t  s~k ,  s ta t  q stat s2~ • • " stat S2k~ 
stat t2 • • • s ta t  t , .  s ta t  s .~  m • • • s ta t  S.,+~.k..,, 
where some or all of the k~ might be 0. 
4.1. Definition. Let T be a set of sen:ences, and let E(x, t) be a set of formulas of 
LA(a~). T strongly omits X if whenewr  S is an S~ as above and S3xq~(x, s, t) is 
consistent with T then for some a e ~, S =Ix ( , (x,  s, t)A'a~r(x, t)) is consistent 
with T. A weak model ~[R* is said t,3 strongly omit X if its complete L(a~) theory 
does (with all l~arameters from M O P~' ) .  
We remark that the phrase "7'  strongly omits ~"  is always used with respect o 
a fixed ordering t of the free ;,econd-order variables in E. 
4.2. Omitting Types Theorem. Let T be a consistent set of sentences of La(a~). 
Suppose T strongly omits ~L, for all n ~ oJ. Then T has a standard model ~ such that 
for all n ~ w, 
(We say ~ omits Y~,, in this case.) 
4.3. Remarks. (A) A similar theorem has been proved for L(O) by Kaufmann. 
(B) Here's an alternate definition of "T  strongly omits Y.(x, t)." Let S denote 
strings of q,lantifiers as before except that =ly, for wtrious i may also occur. Then 
T strongly omits ~ if whenever S3xq~(x,y,s,  t) is consistent with T, so is 
S 3x(~(x, y, s, t)A 7tr(.r, t)) for some tr~.~. It's not hard to see that the two 
definitions are equivalent. For example, suppose T strongly omits ~(x~, x2, t;, t2) 
in the original sense and that 
stat sl 3y~ stat q stat t2 star s2 3y~ 3y3 3x,p 
is consistent with T. Then so is 
stat sa stat tl stat t2 star s2 3x 3yl :[Y2 3Y3 
(Yl E t 1 m Yl E t2A Yl E S2A t~) 
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by the converse of the diagonal intersection axiom (see Lerama 2.9). By the 
original strong omitting condition, there is a ~ ~ X such that 
stat Sl stat h stat, t2 stat s2 ::Ix (3y~ ::ly 2 =ly 3 
(Yl E tl^ yl~ hA ytE t3 A q~) A'70"(X, t)) 
is consistent with T. By manipulating the existential quantifiers and applying the 
contrapositive of the diagonal intersection axiom, we conclude that 
stat s t 3y~ stat tt stat t2 stat s2 ::iy2 =ly3 ::IX (~0 A 70") 
is consistent with T, as desired. So we can use our second strong omitting 
condition whenever we assume the first. And that's what we'll do! 
4.4. Remark. For complete theories T, the converse of the Omitting Types 
Theorem is true. For suppose T has a (standard) model 92 omitting X(x, t). 
Suppose S ::Ix tO(x, s, it) is consistent with T. Then by completeness of T, 
92 ~ S 3x~(x, s, t); 
but 
So 
92 ~ mt Vx V Toy(x, t). 
92 ~ S 3x he(x, s, t)^ V 7or(x, t)~; 
92~S3x V (,¢(x,s, t)A'-:r(x, t))); 
~rC~ 
~ V s 3x (~(x, s, t)^-~o-(x, t)). 
Thus for some tr E X 92 ~ S 3x (q~ ~cr ) .  So S Bx (¢ ^ ~cr) is consistent with T. 
4.5. In this subsection we prove the Omitting Types Theorem for the case 
Tc  L,o~,(m). In Lemma 4.5.1 it is shown that if T strongly omits X, for all n ~ to, 
then T has a weak model strongly omitting each •,. We want to use that model as 
the start of an elementary chain of length to1 of weak models ~R*(~x <too each 
strongly omitting each X,. Thus we have to get from one such weak model to 
another. Lemma 4.5.2 shows (as a special cas~;) that the particular theory T from 
the main lemma for * * ~/R = ~0~ strongly omits ~ ny set of formulas trongly omitted 
by ~¢*~; we can then apply Lemma 4.5.1 to get a model ~/R~*+ 1 for T which strongly 
omits each X,. In fact, Lemma 4.5.3 shows that this T strongly omits the 
"M,-type" (called X in the proof of the main lemma), which means that we can 
,* * >. further require ~,+t  to strongly omit the M,~-type, so that indeed ~+i  
~*  (wrt L(a~)) subject o the requirements in the conclusion of the main lemma. 
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With this basic plan and Lemmas 4.5.1, 2 and 3 behind us, we'll construct oar 
oh-chain with the aforementioned properties (subject to a further inductive 
hypothesis) which ultimately will yield the conclusion of the theorem, at least for 
Tc  L,o,,(a~). Finally, we'll deduce the general case of Tc  La(~)  in Section 4.6. 
Lemma 4.5.1. Let T be a consistent set of sentences of some expansion K(a~) of 
L(a~) by at most countably many constants, and suppose T strongly omits sets 
"2,~ (n ~ to) of form~las of L(a~). Then T has a countable weak model ~2R* strongly 
omitting each Z,~. 
ProoL The proof is an expansion of the proof of the weak completeness 
theorem (3.2) much as the proof of the main lemma (3.4) was such an 
expansion. Le~ (q~,(e n, u~), i,, S,,)~<,o enumerate all triples (q~, i, S) such that i < to; 
¢ = q~(¢, u)e(K(a~)) ' ;  and S is, if possible, an S~, (x, t) as in Definition 4.1 such 
that q is S ::Ix 4r, some q~ - -  otherwise S is some new object like "slash." Note that 
S is uniquely determined by q~ and i. Now proceed as in the proof of the weak 
completeness theorem except for one additional step. Let T~ be the T,~ con- 
structed (in the aforementioned proof) from T,_~. If S, is "slash" or if q~,¢ T~,, let 
Tn = 7"~,. Otherwise, q~, is S, 3x ~, some ~b, and 
stat u 3e S,,3x ( A T~A ~b) 
is consistent with T (by Lemmas 2.6 and 2.2). Choose a or c Z~,, such that 
stat u 3eS,~ 3x (A T~,^ t)/', 70,) 
is consistent with T; this is possible because T strongly omits Z~. Thus 
stat u 3c (A rJ,/xS, 3x (0 A-nor)) 
is consistent with T. We let T,, = T~,U{S, :Ix (t)ATor)}; then the inductive hypoth- 
eses are pres.~rved. 
Now form T~ and ~*  as before. As in Section 3.2, ]!7~* is a weak model of T. 
We need only show that ~*  strongly omits each x2~ to complete the proof of 
Lemma 4.5.1. 
Fix i, and ;let S 3x p be the sort of sentence we have to consider. Choose n so 
that (S ::Ix q~,., S) = (q~, i,,, S,~). We must have added S 3x q~ at stage n since we're 
assuming the: S 3xq~ is in ~)d*, and thus cc, nsistent with T.~,~ by (1)in the proof of 
Lemma 3.2. But then by construction, fo~ some or c ~;, S3x (~ A 7or) ~ T,, c ~, so 
again by (1) of Lemma 3.2, ~2R*~S3x (q~ p, -n or), as desired. This concludes 
the proof of Lemma 4.5.1. [] 
Lemma 4.5.2. Let ~*  be any countable weak model for L(a~), ~ ~stat s 0(s), 
and let T bc ,Ihe associated theory from the proof of the main lemma. For any 
Z(x~ . . . .  , x,, h, . . . , t,n), if gtl~* strongly omits Z, then T strongly omits each of the 
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[oltowing: 
(a) ~(x~ . . . . .  x,,, f l , . . . ,  t,~); 
(b) ~;(x, . . . .  , x,, M, t~ . . . . .  t~). 
]Proof. Though (a) can be deduced more or less from (b), we'll check them 
separately. 
(a) Assume S3x~(x,s ,~; l .  t) is consistent with T. By the same Consistency 
Criterion used in the proof of the main lenTma, we see that ~r~* is a model of 
stat u [ S 3x q~(x, s, u, t) A ,P( U ) i. 
so for some or e ~, 
9R* ~ stat u S 3x (q~ ATCrA tO), 
since ~*  strongly omits E. Thus, S :Ix (~o(x, s, JQ, t)ATo'(X, t)) is consistent with T 
(by ~he other direction of the consistency criterion). 
(b) Let's use t to denote (t2 . . . . .  t~). If S3x~(x ,s ,~ l , t )  is consistent with T, 
then (using the Consistency Criterion) 
~0~* ~stat u ( S 3x q~(x, s, u, ~) A ~(U)). 
By renaming u as tl and playing with quantifiers, we obtain 
~*  ~ stat t~ S 3x (~p(x, s, q, t)A ~(q)). 
So, since (q, f) is (q, t2 . . . . .  t~) = ¢, and since (stat q S) is a string of quantifiers of 
the right form for v_(x, t), there is a t r  ~ ~ such that 
~*  ~ stat tl S :ix(~(x, s, t) ATtr(X, t)A tp(q)) 
So, as desired, the following is consistent with T: 
S'~X(@(X,S,]QI, t)A-70r(X, M, ~)). [] 
Lemma 4.5.3. Let ~[t~* be a weak model, YJY~* ~ stats tb(s), and let T come from 9f~* 
as in the main lemma. Then T strongly omits the M-type E(x)= 
1)tool  The proof of Lemma 4.5.3 is implicit in the proof of the main lemma," bul 
we include it here for completeness. Suppose slat s =Ix ~o(x, s, #/) is consistent with 
T. Then, using the Consistency Criterion (as we will implicitly from now on), we 
see that ~.P~* is a model of: 
stat u (~(U)AStat S :ix q~(x, S, u)). (1) 
To reach a contradiction, let's assume T does not strongly omit E. Then we 
have a formula star s :ix @(x, s,/~T/) such that ~tR* is a model of (1) as well as (2) 
and (3),~ below, for all m ~ M. 
~,~u (tp(u)--~ - lstat s :ix((p(x, s, u)A Xf~ U)); (2) 
mU (~b(U)--~ 7stat  s :ix (@(x, s, U)AX = m)). (3)~ 
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Usin~ these w(; see that ~i~* V (2'), (3') below: 
,~u (~,(u)-- ,  ,~s  Vx (,¢(x, s, u) ~ x ~ u)); (2') 
¥y  ,~u (¢(u) -o ~s  7,p(y, s, u)). (3') 
Br~,t (3') yields (:4) by two uses of the Diagonal Intersection Axiom A5: 
,~u Yy ~ u (~(u)  ~ ,,~s 7~(y ,  s, u)), 
~u (¢(u) --, (¥y ~ u) ,~s 7,p(y, s, u)), 
a~ut '~(u) -oa~s 'Cy  (A~y~s~^y~ u~ 7~o(y, s, u)). (4) 
Inlersecting the sets of u's represented by (1), (2') znd (4) (i,e., use Lemma 2.6 
and Axiom A3) yields ~*  t:slat u [ (5)^(6)^(7)] :  
[$ (u )^stat  s :Ix ~0(x, s, u)], (5) 
[q~(u) --* a~s Vx (q~(x, s, u) --> x ~ u)], (6) 
[$(u) ~ ars Vy (A, Y ¢ s~ ^  y ~ u ~ 7q~)]. (7) 
So 
~*  ~ stat u[stat s 3x ~o Aa~S VX(~O -÷ X em)^ 
,~s ¥x  (A, x e s,  ^ x ~ u - ,  7 q~)]. 
Intersecting the above sets of s and x, again (by Lemma 2.6 and Axiom A3) we 
obtain 
~*  ~ stat u stats  3x(~¢ A ( ,  -;, X e U)A (A~ x e s~ ^  x e u "--> 7~o)), 
and thus 
~*  ~ stat u stats  ~x (x e u ^ -7A~ x E s~). (8) 
But 
~* ~,~u ,~s(A, u ~ s,), (9) 
as we saw before; and (8) and (9) together imply ~l¢*~stat u stats  (false), a 
contradiction. El 
Proof of theorem for L(a~). Let T be a consistent heory of L(a~) which strongly 
omits E,~ for each n E oJ. By Lemma 4.5.1, let ~ be a weak model of T strongly 
omitting each X,,. Partition tot into ~o~ disjoint stationary subsets as in the proof of 
completeness of L(az). We'll apply Lemmas 4.5.1-3 to get a chain (s~*: a < ~o~) 
with the following properties: 
(a) (~1~* : a < ¢o~) satisfies all the conditions of the chain constructed in proving 
completeness of L(a~). Then we can take the union, as in that proof, and get all 
the properties we got in that proof. 
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(b) For all a < t,~, ~*  strongly omits each 
~;,(x, M~,,~e~,. . .  ,,fie,, t~+~ . . . . .  tk.) 
forall /31</32<' - '<b~<a,  0~<~<k,. 
At limits, we simply take unions. It's easy to see that (a) and (b) are presc;ved at 
limits. 
So now assume (a) and (b) are true up to, stage a. To get ~g~*+l, let T~* be the 
theory given by the main Lemma at stage a (from ~]g~* and the appropriate q0. 
Now ~*  strongly omits each 
~Z,(x, lQlt~ . . . . . .  t(4 tj,, t,+ l . . . . .  tk.) for /31</3z<. . .<13~<a,  0~<i~k,, 
by the inductive hypothesis, l/ence, by Lemma 4.5.2, T~* strongly omits each 
and each 
2£,(x,/~ o . . . . . .  /~o,,/~r~,t,+z . . . . .  tk.) for 13~<:.. </3,<c~,0<~i<~k,. 
So by reindexing, T~ strongly omits each 
~,(x,~7/~ . . . . . .  /C-/0,,t~+ 1 . . . . .  tk.) for [3~<'"<[3 i<a+l ,O~i<~k, ,  
Also, by Lemma 4.5.3, T~ strongly omits the M~-type. So by Lemma 4.5.1, let 
~,+~ ~ T* be such that ~2"+~ strongly omits and thus omits the M~-type and each 
E,(x,/~7/~, . . . . .  ,~'/o,,t~+~ . . . . .  tk.) for f l~<. . .</3~<a+l ,0<~i~<k, .  
Then the inductive hypotheses are maintained. 
Let ~ '= l,J,~ ~,*. Then ~+ strongly omits each 
~,(x,/~7/~ . . . . . .  /~t~.) for /3~ < . . .  < B~. < ~o,. 
Since for any c, 3x (x = ¢) is true in ~+, there is some cr ~ ]~. such that 
(x  = c . . . . . .  
is true in 92 ÷. Thus 92 + ~ -~r(c,/~/t~ . . . . . .  r~,~.) for some cre ~. Thus, we can form 
92* as before, and 92"~o,(c,/~/'~ . . . . . .  /~r ). This shows that for ali /3a</32< 
t3 < " - -  <t3 . ,  
Thus (as in Remark 3.10) 
as desired. This completes the proof for the case T= L,~,(a~). 
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4.6. The infinitary case. 
Now we consider the case Tc  La(a~.). To reduce to finitary logic, we replace 
each infinitary conjunction Aq~(x, s) by an atomic formula RA~,(x, s). The exact 
procedure is similar to the reduction in Section 3, but here we are not turning 
~s  q~ into an atomic formula. Consider the following transformation "prime" (') 
from formulas of LA(a~) to those of K,~o,(a,), where here 
K = L U {RA,~(& x) : A q~(S, X) E L a (a~)}. 
¢' is defined by reduction on complexity of ~# so that "prime" commutes with 
everything except: (Aq0' = RA,b. Also note that "prime" has an inverse (-) so that 
(~')- = q~ and (q,-)'= 4,. 
Let T'={q~':Tgq~ and ~0eLa(a0}, and let .g'---{cr':o'e £}. 
Claim 4.6.0. For any q~La(az) ,  Tkq~ iff T'l-e/. 
Pr~,o|. (=),) is by the very definition of T'. To prove (,(=), one argues by induction 
on proofs, that any proof of q~' from T' in K(a~) can be inverted into a proof from 
T of ~o in La(a~). The Axioms of T' invert to theorems of T and the finitary rules 
of inference available in K(a~) invert to thenselves in La(a~). [] 
Cialim 4.6.1. If T strongly omits £(x, t) then T' strongly omits £'. 
PreoI. Suppose S3x~p is consistent with T'. Then by Claim 4.6.0, S3x¢-  is 
consistc,~t with 71 So for some cr ~ £, S =Ix (q) ^°7~) is consistent with T. So 
(again, by Claim 4.6.0), S3x(q~^ 7o") is consistent with T.  [] 
Claim 4.6.2. T strongly omits each £A4, = {TA q~} U {~ : q~ ~s @} for A4) ~ La (m), 
with any order t of the second-order variables in Aq) = Aq)(x, t). 
ProoL This is a consequence of the Axiom A6. Suppose that S is an S:~ for 
S=,vA4, and S3xtk(x,s, t) is c~'nsistent with T. Also suppose that T I -7  
S =Ix ( t )^7¢)  for every ,¢ ~ • (otherwise we are done). This means that T~- 
S* Vx (t) --+ ~) for every q~ ~ q), hence 
Tk A s* Vx (~--, ~), 
~CqJ 
where S* results by replacing each "stat" by "a~" and each "3" by "W'. Using 
Axiom A6 and the first-order valid version of Axiom A6 with "a~s" replaced by 
'"¢x", we obtain that TkS*Yx  (~--~ Aq~). Essentially by Lemma 2.6, we have 
that the latter sentence and S3xtp (which is consistent with T) imply S3x  (~^ 
A q~). Thus, the last sentence is consistent with T, proving the claim by the 
definition of ~A*. [] 
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Now suppose Tc  L,~(a~) strongly omits E, for each n < ¢0. So T' strongly omits 
each E~ ( = {~r': o~ ¢ ,~,}) and each E;x~,( = {o/: a ~ EAO }) by Claims 4.6.1 and 4.6.2. 
Let 92 be the (standard) model of T' omitting each E,  and Y'A* from the proof in 
Section 4.5. We will show that 92 V T and that 92 omits each ,~,. For the latter, we 
show (as before) that 92 strongly omits each 
.v,,(M~,, . . . .  M~,,,x), ¢3,<13~< . - .  </3~. 
By (*), Section 4.5, it suffices to prove the following claim. 
Claim 4.6.3. For any ~ in L,~(a~) with parameters in {AT/,~ :a <~o~}tJ 1921, 
92~(m,/t71) iff 92~o'(m,/~). 
ProoL The only steps which need doing are /~ and a~s in our induction on 
complexity of ~0. We treat A first. 
If 92 ~ (A~(m,/1~))', i.e., 92 g RA~.(ra, ill), then (since 92 ~ T') 92 ~ 4/(m, M) for 
each 4' ~ ~. $o by induction, 92 ~ 4'(m, M), all 4'~ ~; so 92 I:/k ~(m,/140. For the 
other direction, suppose 92~A~(m,M).  Then 92~(m,M) ,  all 4,Eg'; so 
92 ~ 4"(m, M) for all 4'E ~R, by induction. Now we've already seen that T' strongly 
omits each Y-~v~,,~). So by construction of 92, 92 omits E)xv(~.M ), and therefore 
~ (A ~(m, M))' (i.e. 92 ~ R,,,~(m, M)), as desired. 
Now for the a~-step. If 92 t: a~s 4'(m, M, s), then for some cub C~_ ~0~, we have 
Va~C 92 ~ 4'(m, M, M~). 
So 92 ~ 4"(m,M,M,) for all 0e~C; thus 92~a~s~k'(m,M,s). 
That is, 92 ~ (azs O(m, M, s))'; as desired. The converse is just as easy. [] 
4.7. There is a more general version of our Omitting Types Theorem. In the 
version just proved, the "almost all" quantifiers precede the universal (first-order) 
quantifiers. In the general version, we allow any ordering of the quantifiers. 
Corresponding to that ordering, we have notions of "T  strongly omi~.s 2"  and "~ 
omits v,, entirely analogous to the notions we had before. Then the general 
theorem is stated just as the original theorem was stated; however, any ordering 
of ~he quantifiers is allowed, and the notions used are the ones that go with that 
orded~-~g. 
To s~mplify notation we will present only a special case of the generalization. 
Fix a set T of sentences of LA(ae~) and a set E(xl, x2, t~, tz) of formulas of La(a~). 
Consider the ordering < of the variables of 2~ given by x~< tl<X2< t2. Let S 
refer to any sequence of quantifiers which results from inserting various stat ~ 
into the sequence 3x~ star t~ ::Ix2 star t 2. 
Let'~,~ say that T strongly omits E with respect to <(wrt <)  if, whenever 
S~(x,s, t )  is consistent with T (S as above), there is a creE such that 
S(~o(x,s, t)^~or(x, t)) is consistent with 7: Let's say that a model ~ omits 
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.'~(w~t <)  if 
0,! ~ V., h ~t~ Vx2 ~t2 V -l~r(xl, x2, h, t2). 
cxc.~ 
Claim. If T smmgly omits 2 (wrt <) ,  then T has a (standard) model ~ which omits 
v (wrt <).  
Proof. This could be proved by modifying the original proof, lnstead~ we'll show 
how it follows from the previous theorem, Let 
F(x~, ~2, i~, :~,) = ~(xi, x~, t~, t~) u {t,(x,), t~(x,), ~2(x9}. 
First we note that T ~trongly omits F in the original sense. To see this, suppose 
for example that 
stat s~ slat t~ stat t2 stat s2 3x~ 3x2 ~(x, s, t) 
is consistent with T. If some 
stat s~ stat q star t2 stat s2 :Ix~ 3xz (,# ^ -'~6(x~)) 
is consistent with T, for (i, j) = (1, 1), (2, 1) or (2, 2), then we're done. Otherwise, 
stat s, stat t~ stat t2 stats., 3x~ 3x2 (~ A t~(XOA t2(x~)A t2(X2)) 
is consistent with T. Since 
[-~S 1 ¢~t I ,a'zt 2~¢g,S 2 ( t !  C~ S2/ '  , 12 ¢- S2), 
we have that 
stat s~ stat q stat t2 stat s2 3x~ ::Ix 2 
(@ A tl(XI)A t2(Xl) A S2(Xl) A t2(X2) A $2(X2) 
is consistent with T. By the contrapositive of the diagonal intersection principle, 
stat s~ "qx~ s~at ~ ::Ix 2 slat t 2 slat s 2 ~p 
is consistent with 7: But by hypo,.hesis, T strongly omits ~ (wrt <).  So let tr~ 
such that 
stat s~ :lxt stat t~ :Ix 2 stat t 2 star s 2 (~ A-no-) 
is consistent with T. Then also 
stat s, slat t~ slat t 2 stat s2 ~x~ ~x 2 (q~ A-~cr) 
iS consistent with 7, as desired. 
Since T strongly omits I" (in the original sense), there i~ a model ~ of T which 
omits F (in the original sense). Thus 
~:azt ,  a~tz~x~ Vx2( -~(Xl~tlAxl~12Ax2Ct2)Voe~ \/ "30"). 
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Hence 
~I ~ aunt I zazt 2 VX 1E t I N t 2 VX 2 ~ t2 -l . 
So by the converse of the Diagonal Intersection Principle, 
91 ~ Vx~ art~ Vx2 ~t2  V ~r,  
~re~ 
as desired. [] 
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5. A sentence ~ of L (m)  which is not expressible in L~ 
The definition of q~ is based on the fact that there is no sentence of L~ saying 
that two albitrary well-orderings are isomorphic. (See Malitz [22].) A suggestion 
by Kunen has been used to simplify our original example somewhat. 
The kind of model of ~ we have in mind is illustrated in Fig. 1. Here 
ptJ ___ P~,(U), pv  = P~,,(V), and (U, <)  and (V, <)  are disjoint isomorphic well- 
orderings, with R(x, y) saying that x and y have isomorphic order types under the 
restrictions of < to U and V, respectively. 
We take q~ to be (abbreviating slightly) 
a~s :ix 3y [PU(x) ,', pV(y)  ^  x = s N U ^ y = s f3 V ^ R(x, y)]. 
To achieve a contradiction, suppose that ¢ has the same models as some ~' in 
I ...... Let q~ (in L, ...... ) be the conjunction of the following: 
(1)(U, <)  and (V, <)  are disjoint well-orderings and 
Vx Vy (U(x )^ V(y) ~ -~x < y AMy < X). 
(2) e is an extensional relation which is a subset of U × pV U V ~< pv. So we can 
think of the elements of pu and pv  as being subsets of U and V, respectively. 
(3) pv  =P,,,(U) and pv= P,,,(V) (in the sense explained in (2) above). For 
example, one part says 
Vx (P° (x)~: ly~y~ • • .Vz [zex~-~z = y lv  " ' "  vz  = y ,v  . . . ] ) .  
(4) Vx Vy jR(x,  y)*.~PV(x)ApV(y)r,(X, < IX)-~ (y, < ty)]. 
This can be expressed in L ...... 
pU 
(U, < ) 
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We now show that for any ~1 satisfying ~p, 
92~'  iff (U 'a, <~'tO'~)~(V ~, <'~"rV~). (*) 
Suppose first that ] : (U, <)  ~ (V, <)  (abbreviating somewhat). Then 
{s :R (sn  U, sn v)}={s:(sn u,< tsO u)=-(sO v,< lsn v)} 
={s : j " ( snU)=sn v}, 
which is cub. 
For the other direction, suppose 9.I g ~kAq~', but that (U, <)~(V ,  <).  Without 
loss of generality let j map (U, <)  isomorphically onto a proper initial segment of 
(V, <),  and let c be tim <-least element of V\ image (j). Then it's easy to see that 
~a~s R(sn U, sn V) 
~since ~ gq~); 
~ s  (c~ s); 
and 
~a~sR(sn U, sn{x:  x < c}), 
the latter following just as the other direction of this implication did. Intersecting 
these cub sets and using the definition of R given by condition (4) of ¢, 
~s[ (snU,<)~(sAV,<)AcesA 
(sn  u, <)~(s  n{x:  x<c}, <)]. 
But any such s would have s n v isomorphic to a proper initial segment of itself 
(since c ~_ s n V), a contradiction. 
The proof that no sentence ,,0' of L ..... can satisfy (*) is much like the corres- 
ponding proof in Malitz [22]. Let Z ~ ~o~ be sufficiently large so that q '  is in L~.., 
the set of formu!as of L~ of quantifier rank <h.  Let K be such that every 
sentence of L~ is equivalent to one ef L~,. Let c. be large enough so that 
(a,P,o,(a), ~) has a proper L~,-e lememary submodel (/3, P,~,(/3),e). Then we 
define U ~ = V '~ = U ~= a and V ~ =/3. < is defined from the usual ordering on 
ordinals, where < = < I U U < I V in each model ~t, ~.  P~J and pv  are defined to 
be P,,,(U) and P,,,(V) in each model, "Ihen by well-known methods using back- 
and-forth systems, one can easdy see tlmt 9.1 and ~ are elementarily equivalent 
with respect o L2~. Moreover, we can use (4) in the definition of tO to define R ~ 
and R~; then (92, R~) ~t .~(~ , R e) since R has the same definition in Pl as it has in 
~.  Also, each of these structures atisfies ~/~. But then (92, R'~)~o ' and (~, R~)~ 
~q~', by (*). This contradicts the L~.~-equivalence of (2l, R ':~) and (~3, R~*), since ~o' 
is in L~.  
6. A proot theory tot L(a~) 
This sect an can be read after Section 1 and with little detailed knowledge of 
proof theo:-'y. 
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Alan Anderson often argued that evely reasonable foimal system has both a 
Hilbert-style notion of proof (like that given in Section 1) and a Gentzen-style 
notion of proof. While this may overstate the case a bit, it is certainly true that a 
Gentzen-style approach, with ~ts emphasis on rules, rathe- than on axioms, lays 
bare the laws of thought inherent in any given logic in a way not done by a 
Hiibert-style system. Thus it is satisfying that stationary logic does have a 
reasonable Gentzen-style complete set of rules and, moreover, that one can prove 
a Cut-elimination I"heorem for it. 
The cut-free system has the usual subformula property so that we obtain, as 
corollaries, Gentzen systems for L(O) and the intermediate logic L°°L 
The crucial rule in our Gentzen system for I.,(~) is the rule (sl-) below. 
However, as far as L(O) and U ''~ are concerned, there is no real way to use the 
full power of this rule. A weaker rule wk-(sF) suffices. Considering this rule, we 
are led in the next section to the study of other meanings of the quantifier "almost 
all." Thus, for a change, there is a real interaction between model theory and 
proof theory, the interaction going both ways. 
We begin by restricting ourselves to the finitary case and assume that our 
language L has no function or constant symbols. We will discuss the extensions 
later. We treat equality as a non-logical symbol. We assume in this section that all 
logical symbols are defined in terms of the primitives ^ , --1, V, ~,z. 
We use F, ~', F,/t ' ,  F~ . . . .  to range over finite sets of L(~) formulas. We write 
F, q~ for FO{q~} without assuming that q~¢[: We write F, /I for FUA. 
In ordinary logic a sequent is simply an ordered pair (F, zl), written Fk/.l since 
all the free variables are treated equally. In stationary logic, however, we must 
somehow set up a system which allows us to derive 
a~so at~sl (so C - s l ) ,  
which is valid, but which does not allow us to derive 
~s l  ~so (so-  C sl), 
which only holds in countable models. Thus we define a sequent for L(a~) as a 
triple (q, F, A) where q is a finite sequence (not set) of variables of both kinds, 
first- and second-order. We write a sequent (q, F, zl) as q: FFA. A variable is 
completely free in q: Fkzl if it does not appear in q. 
To explain the intuitive meaning of q: FkA, write ~ for the result of putting V 
in front of each first-order variable xi, a~ in front of each second-order variable si. 
A derivation of q:4FF,~l is intended to demonstrate hat, for all structures ~ and 
all assignments of the completely free variables, ~?/(AF---~Vz~). Thus, we call a 
sequent q: / 'FA valid if this is the case; that is, if for all ~ and all assignments o
the completely free variables, ~I~(AF---~VA).  In stating our axioms and rules, 
we must make sure that they preserve validity. This will be verified in the proof of 
the Soundness Theorem. 
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Axioms. 
(A×) q: f', q~ l- A, ¢. 
(l-s) q: F l -a,  ~(x). 
In the Axiom (l-s), it is required that s occur in q and that x does not occur after s 
in the sequence q. 
Rules. 
(A k) 
q: F, q), ~ l -a  
q: F, q~ A ~/JkA ' 
(kA) q: FkzL ~ q: Fl-zi, qJ 
q: F l -a , (~A6)  ' 
(7  k) q: Fl-zI, q~ 
q: F, ~ l -A  ' 
(1__1) q: F, q~ka 
q: FkA, m~ ' 
(Vk) q: F, "~(x) l-A 
q: F, Vy q~(y)l-A ' 
(I-V) q: FFA, ¢(x) 
q: Fl-zl, Vy q~(y)" 
In the Rule (l-V), it is required that x not be free in FUA a~,d that x be the last 
variabic in the string q to be free in Ft Jz l  U{q~(x)}. 
(~k)  q: F, ~(s ' )ka  
q: F, ~,s ~(s)l- a ' 
(kay) q:Fl-A, ~(s') 
q: Fk  za, a~s ~p(s) " 
In both ihese rules it is required :hat s' be the last variable in q to be free in 
FUZ~ U{~p(s')}. In Rule (I-a0 it is also required that s' is not free in FU/ t .  
We now come to the most important rule, (sk,  and the weaker form wk-(~l-). 
The Rule (sl-) is valid by the Diagonal Intersection Property of the cub filter. 
(sk) qoxqlq2: i'l- ZI 
qoqlxq2: I, s(x)kzl ' 
where s is a second-order variable not in q2 and, if it is in q~, then it must be the 
very first variable in q~. (Other possibilities are where s is in qo or else s in none 
of qo, ql, qv)  
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The rule wk-(sl-) is just like the rule (sl-) except that s is allowed to be in 
neither q, nor q2. To check its validity one only needs the countable completeness 
of the cub filter. 
We need a trivial variable rule. 
q: FFA 
(D) %: FF,~ 
In the rule (D) ("D" is for "delete"), qo results from q by deleting some variables 
in q not free in FU& 
Finally, we state the Gentzen-style analogue of modus ponens, the Cut Rule. 
q: I.~pFA q: Ft-A,¢/ 
(Cut) 
7: FF A 
6.1. Definition. A sequent q: Ft-A is L(a~)-derivable if it is in the smallest set of 
sequents containing the Axioms (Ax), (t-s) and closed under the rules above. It is 
L(a~)-derivable without cut if it is in the smallest set containing the axioms and 
closed under all the rules except he cut rule. 
We make obvious modifications on this definition. For examplie, we say ~h ~t a 
sequent is U'"~-derivable if it is in the smallest set Y of sequents q: FFA ,dth 
F U A c_ L p°~ such that Y contains the axioms (Ax), (bs) and is closed unde~ the 
rules above. We say that q: FI-A is L(a~)-derivable using wk-(sb) if every instance 





6.2. Lemma. The set of L(a~)-derivable s quents i closed under the [ollowing rules. 
So is the set of sequents L(a~)-derivahle without cut. The same holds with Rule (sb) 
replaced by Rule wk-(sb). 
q: FF A 
qoq: F, F'F A, .~.' (qoc~ a sequence of distinct variables), 
qoqlxq2: F~- A 
qoxqlq2: FF A ' 
qlxq2: FF A 
q~q2: FI-A ' 
q: FF A, q~, O 
q: r t 'a , (~ v 0) '  
(V~-) q:/', ~l-a q:l",Ot-a 
0__~ ) q:r,~l-a,~ 
q: FFzL (~ ---* th)' 
(--~ I-) q: F, q~t-a q: Ft-,a, 
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Proo[. The first three are by induction on the notion of derivable, and are easy. 
The others follow from the defioitions of V, "+ from -1, A. []  
Given these derived rules, let's write down some derivations of some formulas 
that will be of use to us. 
6.3. Examples. (i) A derivation of Axiom A2, ms (sot_ s). 
s: ~'s(x) (ks), 
x, s: ks(x) (Add), 
s, x: so(x)~'s(x) wk-(s~-), 
s, x:t-so(x)--+ s~ x) 0--~,), 
s: ~'Vx (so(x) "+ s(x)) (I-V), (D), 
~- a~s Vx  (So(X)"+ s(x)) (I-m), (D). 
This derivatkm is cut-free and uses only wk-(sl-). 
(ii) A derivation of ms (~ ~ tk), ms q~ I-a~s tk First, one uses the propositional 
rules to get a derivation of s: (~,--+ if), q~l-O. Then: 
s: (~ ~ ~), ~ I--,/,, 
s: ms O# -+ ~), a~s,~t-g, (rot-) twice, 
ms (q~ --+ ~), ms q~ Fins ~ (I-m), (D). 
(iii) A derivaticm of Vy ~ s,~ a~s ~(x, s) l -ms Vx ~ so ~(x, s) using only wk-(sb). 
To derive this, w,: lirsl dcri~e 
x, s: ms  ~x,  s), so(x)t- ~(x, s), 
which is easy. This, with x, s: So(X)~-so(x), yields, by (---~1-), 
x, s: so(x) -+ ms ~#(x, s), so(x)~- ~(x, s). 
Now we use the rule wk-(sF-), with the w~riabm s,, to obtain the first line of the 
following: 
s, x: So(X) ---> ms ~,(x, s), so(x)~- ~(x, s), 
s, x: Vx (so(x)--, ms  q~(x, s))l-so(x) --, ,#(x, s) 0 -~) ,  (Vl-), 
s :Vxeso~sq~(x ,s ) t 'Vx(so(x ) -~q~(x ,s ) )  (~/), (D), 
Vx E so ms  ~(x, s ) l -~s  Vx E so q~(x, s) (I-a~), (D). 
(iv) We contrast (iii) with a derivation of Axiom A5, 
¥x  ms ,p(x, s)~- a~s Vx ~ s qo(x, s). 
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To derive this we must use the full Rule (st-), 
x, s: ,p(x, s)t- ~c(x, s) 
x, s: Yx a~s ~(x, s)l ,~(x~ s) 
s, x: Yx  ~s  ~o(x, s), s(x)l- ~o(x, s) 
s: Vx ~s ~(x, s)t 'Vx (s(x) ~ ~o(x)) 
Vx ,us ,p(x, s)~" ms  ¥x  c s ~o(x) 
not just wk-(sD. 
(Ax), 
(a#), then (YI-), 
(st-), 
(I---*), (I-V), (D), 
(t-a~), (D). 
We now state the main results for this system. 
6.4. ~oundness Theorem. Every L(az)-derivable sequent is valid. 
6.5~ Completeness Theorem. Every valid sequent is L(a~)-derivable. 
6.6. Cut-elimination Theorem. Every L(a~).derivable sequent is L(a~)-derivable 
without cut. The same holds with Rule (sl-) replaced by Rule wk-(st-). 
These are prc~ved in Sections 6.10-6.12 below. 
As corollaries of these three results we obtain complete, cut-free Gentzen 
systems for L(Q) and LP°L 
6.7. Corollary. Let q: F~- A be an L(Q) (or L p°~) sequent. Then q: Ft- A is valid iff it 
is L(Q)-derivable (L~-derivable) without cut. 
1ProoL This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 together 
with the observation that a cut-free derivation of an L(Q)-sequent can only 
involw L(Q)-formulas, by the subformula property. Similarly for L p°s. [] 
If one examines proofs of ~equents from L(Q) or L p°~, e.g. Example 6.8 below, 
one sees that one ~,ever eally uses the full Rule (sl-), rather, only the weaker Rule 
wk-(sl-). One can give a direct proof that any LP°S-derivation of an L p°s sequent 
q: FI-A can be transformed into one that only uses the weaker lmle. Instead, we 
will ask a more general question. Exacdy which ,Mid sequeats of L(az) are 
provable using the weaker ule? This leads us to the ccuntably complete filter logic 
Ln~(,~) of the next section. 
6.8. Example. A cut free L(Q)-derivation of Keisler's crucial axiom for L(Q). Our 
aim is to derive: 
Yx -:t~oy q~(x, y), 3~ox 3y q~(x, y)l-:i~'~oy :ix ~x ,  y). 
This is shorthand for ,. 
Vx ,,~s ¥y [~(x, y) ~ s(y)], a~s Vx [3y ~(xl y) --> s(x)] 
t-~s Vx Vy [~(x, y) --, s(y)]. 
206 J. Batwise, M. Kaufmann, M. ldakkai 
The trick in all such proofs is to fix a countable so on the left at the first 
opportunity. For us, this means we derive the above from the following sequent 
so: Vx ,~s Vy [,p(x, y) --, s(y)], Vx [3y ,p(x, y) ~ So(X)] 
t-,~s Vx ¥y [~(x, y) ~ s(y)] 
by using Rules (a~l-) and (D). This, in turn, comes from 
so, s, x,,: ,,~s Vy [q~(x,,, y) --, s(y)], 3y q~(xo, y) ~ so(x(,) 
I-Vy [~(x,,, y) ~ s(y)] 
by using Rule (VF) twice, then Rule (FV) to get rid of xo, then Rule (Va~) on the 
variable s, then Rule (D). This is derived from the fc-llowing two sequents by Rule 
(---, I-). 
So, s, Xo: a~s Vy [q;(Xo, y)--'~ s(y)]k3y ~O(Xo, v),'Cy [q~(Xo, y)---~ s(y)], 
So, ~, Xo: ,~s Vy [~(xo, y )~ s(y)], So(Xo)l-Vy [~(Xo, y )~ s(y)]. 
The first of these is just first-order !ogic. The second comes from the following by 
the Rule wk-(sk). 
So, XoS: a~s Vy [~O(Xo, y) ~ s(y)]kVy [~p(xo, y) --~ s(y)]. 
This, of course, is just the result of applying Rule (a~F) to the Axiom 
so, xo, s: Vy [~0(x,,, y ) - ,  s(y)]FYy [~o(x,,, y )~ s(y)]. L-J 
6.9. Remark. Before turning to the proofs of Theorems 6.4-6.6, we pause to 
discuss the question of the interpolation Theorem, or Craig's Theorem. Shelah 
pointed out over breakfast with the first author that considerations involving 
~ronszajn trees show that interpolation fails for L(a~). His proof, to appear in 
Makowsky-Shelah [19] shows that there are sentences ~p(X), ~(1~ <,©) of L(Cl) 
~uch that ~¢(X) --* ~$(]~ <,© ) is vai~d, but there is no interpolant even in Lo,~o(a~). 
(q~(X) says X is an uncountable branch through a tree, $(f, <,©) says that f is an 
order preserving map of the tree into the rationals (©, <).) A different proof of 
this, one wh)ch uses the ideas of Section 3, will appear in Kaufmann [14]. If one 
takes the trouble to see where the usual proof of "cut elimination::> 
interpolation" breaks down, it is in the Rule (st-), or even with the Rule wk-(sl-). 
The lack of symmetry between the Axiom (bs) and the Rule (sF) seems to block 
interpolation. 
6.10. Proof of the Soundness Taeorem. This is by induction on the notion of 
L(a~)-derivable. One shows that all the ~xioms are valid and that the rules 
Stationary Logic 207 
preserve validity. We list below the non-trivial axioms and rules next to the 
corresponding properties of the cub filter. 
(~ s) {s ! x ~ s} is cub. 
(FA) The cub filter is closed under intersection. 
(a~t-) The cub filter is indeed a filter. 
wk-(sl-) The cub filter is cour~tably complete. 
(sk) Diagonal Intersection Property. 
(Cut) The cab filter is closed under intersection. 
We leave it to the reader to check the details. 
6,11. Proof of the Completeness Theorem. Call a formula ~ derivable if F~ is 
derivable. 
(1) Every instance of a propositional tautology is derivable. 
In fact, you can do (1) with q empty using just Rules (Ax), (AF), (FA), (-ak), (FT) 
by the usual prooL See Barwise [3] for example. 
(2) Vx ~(x)--> q~(y) is derivable, for all q~. 
You just apply Rules (Vl-) to q~(y)F~o(y). 
(3) Axioms (A0)-(A5) of Section 1 are derivable. 
We've done the more interesting cases in Example 6.3. 
(4) (Modus ponens) If q~, (~ -* if) are derivable, so is ft. 
This follows from cut. For we have (using Rule (--~F)) ~0, (q~-o ff)k~k; Fq~; and 
I-(~o--~ ~) derivable; two cuts give us F~b. 
(5) (Generalization) If 7]--~ ~o(v) is derivable, and v is not free in ~ then 
r~ --> Vv q~(v) is derivable. 
First, using "O ~ ~o(v), rlFq~(v) and then cut, we get "ql-q~(v). Then use Rule (kV) 
and then Rule (k-->). 
(6) (a~-generatization) If r I ~ q~(s) is derivable, and s is not free in ~ then 
--> ms ~(s) is derivable. 
Just like (5), except you must use Rule (Add) to go from r/Fq~(s) to s: r/I-q~(s), 
then on to "0 I-ars ¢p(s). 
If we combine (1)-(6) and the Completeness Theorem of Section 1, we see that 
if q~ is valid then F~ is derivable. Thu% if q: FFA is a valid sequent, we have 
Ftj(A/'--~ Vzl) is derivable. But what we want is q: FFA. This follows from (7) 
and several applications of cut. 
(7) The following is derivable: q: ~o I-q~. 
The proof is by inducticn on the length of q. We do a typical case: 
St, X, S2: a~s I V:¢ a~S2 q~ F tp. 
Begin with q~ l-% then apply Rule (a~F) tO Sz, then Rule ('¢1-) to x, then Rule (mE) 
to s~. [] 
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6.12, Proef of the Cut Elimination Theorem. To prove the theorem we will neeo 
a notion of L(a,,)-derivation to go along with the notion of L(a~)-derivable used 
above. A derivation ~ of q: Ft-A is a finite tree like 
of sequents which has axioms at the upper nodes and such that each node not at 
the top follows from the one or two nodes directly above it by one of the rules, 
and ~uch that q: Ft-A is the unique bottom node. We take it that anyone who has 
rea0 :'~i ~ar cau formalize this imprecise definition. (Otherwise look in Feferman 
[9], 'i'~=.¢uti [27], or Barwise [113 We prove the result for the system with Rule 
(st-) and the one with Rule wk-(st-) at the same time. {Any remarks needed for the 
weaker system are put in braces.} The theorem follows by induction from the 
following lemma. 
6.13. Lemma. /f qo: Fo, ~¢l-zio and qt: rll'A1, ~ have cut-free derivations @o and 
~ respectively, and if q results from each q~ by deleting some variables not free in 
FoO Fa O AoO z~ O{~o}, then there is a cut-free derivation ~ of 
q: G), Fl['z~oaz. 
We refer to this rule as cut in the proof that follows. Notice that it is a derived 
rule of the system with cut, using Rules (Add), (D), and what we called (Cut) 
before. 
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows the usual pattern of cut elimination 
arguments. We will set up the double induction and outline the proof, filling in 
details ,~nly in those cases where unfamiliar considerations arise from az. 
Let c(~o) be the complexity of ,  measured by length, number of symbols, some 
such thing let rig, ~o)~ the rank of q) in 9, be defined for cutof-ee ~ as follows, by 
induction. If ~ is an axiom q: f'I-A then r(~, q~)= 1 for all .eFOA,  r(@,cp)=O 
for all other ~¢. If ~b ends in a step 
~oj 
qo: ro F~o 
then for ~o ~/-'l !3 Zll, r(~, q~) = r(~o, ~¢)+ 1. For ~o~ El O A~, r(~, ~) = O. If ~ ends 
in 
So $1 
q: rt-A ' 
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then for q~roza ,  r (D,~)=r(Do,~c)+r(D~,q0+l .  For ~0~FUA, r(~,q~)=0. 
Thus r(~, q~) is the size of the largest subtree of sequents in which q~ occurs. If D 
is as in Lemma 6.13, then define r(D, q~)= r(~o, q~)+ r (~,  ~)+ 1. 
We will prove that for all natural numbers c and all natural numbers r, if ~ is 
any derivation which ends with a cut of the form 
D ( } O~ l
q& 1"~, q~F Ao ql: FI F AI, 
q: I]~, F, FAo, A, 
where Do, ~ and the sequents are as in the lem:na, if c(q~)= c and r(~, ~0)= r
then there is a cut-free derivation of q: Fo, rtFAo, A~. 
The proof is by induction on c and then on r. Thus we may fix q~, D as above 
and assume that the lemma holds for all q~*, 9"  with c (~*)<c= c(q0, or with 
c(q~*)~c and r(D*, ~*)<r= r(D, q~). Note that r~>3 since ~ occurs in the end 
sequents of both Do and ~t. 
In the following we let F=FoOr~, A =Z~oUA~. We let So be the sequent 
qo: Fo, q~bAo, St be the sequent qt: F~l-/~t, q~ and S be the end sequent q: FF/L 
Thus ~ ends with the cut 
~0 ~ 1 
So $1 
S , 
where both Do and 2~ are cut-free. The proof breaks into cases (A) where r = 3 
and (B) where r > 3. 
Case (A). r = 3. This means that q~ only appears in the end sequents So and $1, 
not from the sequents just above them in 9o and Dr. Thus each S, (i = 0, 1) is 
either an axiom or else q~ was introduced into St in the very last step of ~.  This 
gives us three subcases: 
(A1) So is an axiom, 
(A2) So is not an axiom and St is an axiom, 
(A3) neither So nor S~ is an axiom. 
(AI) So is an axiom. If q~: FoI-Ao is still an axiom, we can use Rules (D), and 
(Add) to get S. Otherwise, the appearance of q~ on the left must be crucial, so So 
must be of the form qo: Fo, ~¢l-Ao where q~Zao. But then ~p~/t =AoU/t  I so we 
obtain S by weakening S~, just apply Rules (D) and (Add). 
(A2) So is not an axiom and S~ is an axiom. If S is an (Ax)-Axiom, or if 
q~: F~I-A~ is still an axiom, then proceed as in (A1). The other possibility which 
might arise at first glance is where q~ is s(x) and S~ is of the form q~: FIFAt, s(x), 
where q~ is a string of variables with s in it and x not after s in q~. Look at Do to 
see how So was derived. Since r = 3, r(Do, s(x))= 1 so the last step in Do must 
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introduce s(x) by Rule (sF) {or wk-(sF)}: 
qo: FoFz~o 
qo: F,,, s(x)FZio " 
But then either s is not in qo or else x is after s in qo. Thus, there is no way to get 
q f-ore both qo and ql by deleting variables not free in F~.3 A U{s(x)}. In other 
words, there is no way to use Axiom (Fs) to cut out an s(x) or, the left just after it is 
introduced by Rule (sF) {or wk(sb)}. 
(A3) Neither S(, nor S~ is an axiom. Thus both final inferences in ~o and ~ 
introduce ~. Furthermore ~ canno~ be of the form s(x) since there is no way to 
introduce s on the right except as an axiom. Thus ~ is not an atomic formula. 
There are feur cases depending on whether ~ begins 
(a) with --1, 
(b) with/k, 
(c) with ~ or 
(d) with a~. 
Cases (a) and (b) are like the usual proofs. You, ~ply the induction hypothesis on 
c(q~) to the next to the last sequents in ~o, ~ to obtain the desired result. 
(A3c) Suppose q~ is '¢x O(x). The derivations 90, 91 end as follows. 
9o ends with an application of Rule (VF). 
qo: Fo, ~/J(y)F a,, 
qo: Fo, Vx ~/,(x)Fao ' 
:~ ends wP-h Rule (F'¢). 
ql: FlkA~, ~(z) 
q~: F1F A 1, Vx ~,(x) '
Here z is the last variable in q~ free in FjUza~U{qJ(z)l and z is not free in 
F~U/t~. We may assume that y does not occur after z in q~, for if it does we 
sirr~ply change it to a y' not in 9o or 9~. The idea, as usual, is to change z to y 
and then apply cut by the induction hypothesis on complexity. But we mus~ keep 
the string q~ the same so that qo and q~ will give rise to q. Thus we need the 
followi~g lemma. 
Sublemma. If q, z, q': F(z)F zl(z) has a cut-free derivation ~, and if y is not in q' 
then there is a ct;-free derivation f~' of q, z, q': F(y)ka(y).  
The ,~.ublemma is proved by induction on @. The hypothesis y ~q' is needed for 
Axiom (l-s). 
Given the sublemma we get a derivation 9 '  of ql: F1F~I, ~(Y). We now apply 
the induction hypothesis (and possibly Rule (D)) to get q: FI-A. 
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(A3d) Suppose ~o is a~s if(s). The derivations No and 31 end as follows, with 
applications of Rules (a~-), (I-a,) respectively. 
qo: Fo, ~b(so)F Ao 
qo: to, a~s O(s)Fao " 
ql: r l t '~ l ,  q~(sl) 
ql: FI t'al, ,~s O(s) ' 
where s, is the last variable in qo free in Fo, An, qJ(so) and sl is the last variable in 
q~ free in F~, z~l, O(sO. Further, s~ is not free in 1'~ U zll, but it might be free in 
Fo. An so it might or might not occur in q. If sl (resp. So) does not occur in q, then 
change so to s~ in fl~o (resp. sl to so in 31) and apply the induction hypothesis. 
Th :s, we assume So and % both occur in q. If So and sl are the same variable, we 
may apply the induction hypothesis directly. The only case left is where so, Sl are 
distinct, and botb in q, hence both in each of qo and ql- If So precedes ~ in q, then 
apply the following, sublemma to 30. If sl precedes So in a then apply it to 3> In 
either case we can then apply the induction hypothesis to get q: FFzl. 
Sublemmm If q, s, q': F(s)F A(s) has a cut-free derivation ~ and no variable in q' 
is free in F(s)OA(s),  and if s '~q' then q, s,q': F(s')Fz~(s') also has a cut-free 
derivation. 
This is easily seen using Rule (D) and its obvious converse, and finishes case 
(A3d), hence case (A3), and thus case (A). 
Case (B). r :> 3. This means r(3o, ~)t> 2 or r(31, q~)~> 2 or both. We assume that 
~F1UAo,  since otherwise we may obtain S from one of So or $1 by Rule (Add). 
(B1) r(~ o, q0~>2. We need to consider two possibilities here, 
(a) where q~ is not actively involved in the last inference, and 
(b) where ~0 is actively involved, or as it is called in the literature, where ~ is 
the principal formula oi the last inference. 
(Bla) Assume q~ is not the principal formula in the last inference in 30. As 
usual, what we want to do is to apply the induction hypothesis to the derivation(s) 
of the next to last sequent(s) in 3o (with smaller rank) and then perform the last 
step used in ~,  to get S. This works as long as the last step in 3o doesn't alter the 
string of variables in front. For example, suppose 3o ends with Rule (FA) applied 
to ('/'1 ,', '/'2): 
F ' qo: Fo, q~ Ao, 01 qo: ro, q~l-A~, ~z 
qo: ro, q)l~a'o, (I/¢1A 02) 
The induction hypothesis gives us cut-free derivations of q: Fo, Fit" A'o, ~bl, A1 and 
q: Fo, FIFA'o, ~2, AI. Then we apply Rule (FA) to get 
q:/'o,/'1Fa'o, al ,  (01 ^  02), 
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which is S. So we need only check the rules which alter variable strings, the Rules 
(sk) {or wk.-(si-)} and (D). The Rule (D) causes no trouble because we have built it 
into cut in the lemma. So suppose No ends with 
q', x, q", q": F~, C kZao 
q', q", x, q": Fo, ~, s(x)kao " 
Let q~ be ¢", x, q", q" and let q'~ be the result of moving x left to a corresponding 
spot in q~, and define q' similarly. We apply Rule (ML) to ~ to get a derivation 
~;  of qi: F~I-A~,~p. (Actually, we need to check that we can get a ~ with 
r(@~, p) =, (~ ,  ~p), but there is no trouble with this.) This puts us in a position to 
apply the inductive hypothesis to get a cut-free derivation of q': F~', F~FAo, A~, 
Then apply Rule (sb) {or wk-(sk)} to get q: Fd, !"~, s(x)kzao, A~, which is S. 
(Blt~) Suppose now that ~ is the principal formula in ~o. We now have five 
possibilities, depending on where q~ is of the form s(x), (tb~ ^ ~),  -7tp, Vx ~(x) or 
,,~s ~(s). 
(Blbi) Suppose q~ is s(x) so that we are trying to eliminate the final cut from the 
following picture. Recall that r(~o, s(x)) > 1. 
0 
q', x, q", q': Fo, s(x)k Ao 
q'q", x, q": Fo, s(x)kAo q~: F~FA~, s(x) 
q: .,fro, F~ kAo, A~ 
We apply the following sublemma to 2~,'~ to get a derivation ~;  of So with 
r(~d, s(x))= r (~,  s(x))<r(~o,S(X)). Then we can apply the induction 
hypothesis. 
Sublemma. If ~ is a cut-free derivation of 
q', x, q", q"': F, s(x)kA 
where s is not in q'" and, if in q", is the first variable in q", then there is a cut-free 
derivation ~' of 
q', q", x, q': F, s(x)kA 
with r(~, s(x))= r(~', s(x)). 
This is proved by induction on length of ~. The only interesting case is where 
is the Axiom (ks), in which case ~'  is an (Ax)-Axiom. 
(Blbii) if ~ is -7~b or (~1 ^  ~2), the proof is just like in the first-order case, and is 
simpler than the following two subcases. 
(Blbiii) If ~ is Vx~b(x) then we are faced with the following picture: 
qo: Io, Vx ~(x), ~(y)t-,a,, 
___qo- ..to, Vx ~(x) ~ ~.o ........ q.~..!.., r,  ~ A,, Vx. ~(x) 
q: Fo, F1 kAo, A1 
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it is annoying, but the variable y may or may not appear in q0, and if it appears in 
q(j it may or may not appear in q. We treat the case where y is in qo but not in q. 
Thus y is not free in I'tAA. Let q~ be the result of putting y in q~ in a spot 
compatible wit~ qo, and similarly with q. Let 9~ be a cut-free derivation of 
q~: F~t-A1, Vx 0(x) with r(9~, Vx 4'(x)) = r (~,  Vx #(x)). (This calls for another 
obvious sublemma, which we omit.) Apply the induction hypothesis to 90, 9~ to 
get a cut-free derivation ~*  of q': I ,  t~(y)bA. Let ~** be a cut-free derivation of 
q~: Vx ~(x)bq~(y) with r(9**, Vx ~(x)) = 1. The induction hypothesis applied to 
9** and 9~ gives a cut free derivation ~*** of ql: F~-A~, ~(y). The induction 
hypotheses on c applied to ~* and a~*** yield a cut-free derivation of q': f'kA. 
Then we apply Rule (D) to get q: F~-A. 
(Blbiv) The situation with ~ = a~s q~(s) is similar but a little different because of 
the (a~b)-rule's extra condition on variables. We are faced with the following 
situation~ 
q's'q": Fo, ~s  ~(s), t~(s')f- ~o 
q's' q": Fo, a~s $(s)b Ao qt: Fl ~ al, a,s 4,(s) 
q: F~-A 
The situation is straightforward if q contains the variable s'. One uses a derivation 
9** of q~: a~s ff(s)btk(s') of rank t as before. If s' is not in q then it ~s not free in 
I"Uzl so we can modify 9~ to get a cut-free derivation 9~ of the same rank (i.e. 
r (9; ,  ,p)= r(91, ~)) of q~: Fl~'A1, a~s~(s), where q~ has s' inserted at the right 
place in q~. Then we again argue as in part (Blbiii). This finishes (B1). 
(B2) r(gc.~, ~p)= I and r(fi)l, ~o)~2. Again we have cases 
(a) where ~ is not the principal formula in the last inference in ~1 and 
(b) where it is. 
Case (a) is just as in (Bla). 
Case (B2b). This time we do not need to consider ~ = s(x) since this cannot be 
the principal formula in 9~. So we are left with ~p of the forms ~0, (tp~,,,tp2), 
Vx q~(x) and a~s +(s). These are all entirely analogous to the corresponding cases 
in (Blb), so we leave them to the interested reader. [] 
6.14. Remarks. To extend t6 languages with terms we modify Axiom (bs) to 
O-s) q: I'~-.4, s(z) 
with the condition that s is in q but no variable in the term • should occur after s 
in q. Rule (Vt-) is modified as usual. To extend to the infinitary case, LA(a*), one 
follows Feferman [9]. 
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7. Other meanings ot "almost alW 
The difference between the Rule (st-) and the weaker Rule wk-(sl-) tempts us to 
look for a different meaning of a~, one where the wk-(sl-)-Rule would give us 
exactly the valid sequents. This logic should still contain L ~'~, and hence L((I). 
Let ~__q P~,~(M) be any filter. We can interpret a ,  in the expanded structure 
(~O~, ) by 
For ~ = ~c.t, = the cub filter, thi:~ is ~he old definition. What other ~'s  are there to 
try? 
7.1. Definition. The eventual filter on P~,,,(M) is the filter generated by sets of the 
form 
x~,, = {s I s,,~- s} 
for Soe Po,,(M). 
Since (-]~<,~X,, = Xu ...... the eventual filter is countably complete. With this 
meaning of "almost aW'~ all of the rules of our Gentzen system are va'Jd, 
including Rule wk-(sl-), but not Rule (sl-). h~ terms of Section 1, this meanii~g of 
"almost all" satisfies all ~f Axioms (A0)-(A4) and our rule of o~-generalization, 
but not Axiom (A5). 
There is, however, no Completeness Theorem or Compactness Theorem for 
this meaning of almost all. The set of valid sentences is not arithmetical (or even 
II~O. These negative results follow from the following result (and obvious 
strengthenil~gs). 
7.2. Proposition. There is a sentence ~(N, <, . . . )  of L(n~) such that, when ~ is 
reinterpreted by the eventual filter, every model TR of ~p has (N ~, <~r~)--= (to, <). 
Proof. ~ can be defined once we observe that a certain class of well-ordered 
structures c{n be characterized in this logic. Let qJ say that < is an col-like linear 
ordering in which every element has an immediate successor, such that some final 
segment is well-ordered. It's not hard to see that this can be said as follows: 
3so Vs _~ % (s has a sup), i.e. a~s(s has a sup). 
Let 0 say that given any interval [0, z), and an x, Ihen f(x, z,.) takes [0, z) in an 
order-preserving way to [x, y) for some y. Clearly any model of ~A 0 has order 
type ,)~. ¢ is 
qsa OAVx(N(x)~Vy <~ x (y = 0 or y has an immediate predecessor)). V_.] 
Gnce we give up on the eventual filter, where do we go? There aren't a whole 
lot of filters on P~,(M) that have names, that is, that are defined in a uniform way 
on all M. So, we punt and leave ~ undetermined. 
Stationt~ry Logic 215 
7.3. Definition. Filter logic LJ:~'(a~), more accurately called No-complete filter 
logic, has the same syntax as L(a~). A structure, howevei, consist of a pair (~R, ~), 
where ~ is a countably complete filter containing the eventual filter. Satisfaction is
defined as above, vt, L .... (~) and its countable fragments L,~(a~) are defined 
analogously. 
There is a Completeness Theorem for filter logic by using Rule wk-(sl-) rather 
than Rule (st-). In terms of a Hilbert-style system, this amounts to replacing 
Axiom A5 by: 
Yx c so a~s ¢(x, s) --~ a~s Vx ~ so ~o(x, s). wk-(A5) 
Notice that Axioms (A0)-(A4)+ wk-(A5) are valid in all our structures, as are 
the axioms and rules of the Gentzen system with Rule wk-(sF). Since we have 
already shown how t ,  ;rove Axiom wk-(A5) in the Gentzen system using only 
Rule wk-(sl-), we will get completeness of both systems by showing completeness 
of the Hilbert style system. This proof also gives compactness for filter logic. 
7.4. Theorem The Compactness, Completeness and Omitting Types Theorems 
proved earlier for L(az) and L,o,o(a~) are also true for the filter logics LF~(az) and 
7.5. Corollary. A sequent q:FF A is provable in the weak Gentzen system (Ax), 
(ks), (F.,x), (^1-), (k-n), (~F), (D), (P) and wk-(sF) iff it holds in all structures (~,~)  
for filter logic. 
7.6. Corollary. Any valid sequent q: FFzA of L p°~ is derivable using only the Rule 
wk-(sF) (as opposed to Rule (sF)). Hence the same holds for L(CI). 
Proof, Let (~R,~I), (~,~2) be two structures for LF~'(a~) with the same ~IR. An 
easy inductive proof shows that for any q~ of L p'~, (~,  ~l)~q~ iff (~,  ~2)~p, for all 
substitutions of the free variables. I.e., the formulas of L p°~ are invariant under 
changes of filters. Thus, if they are valid under their intended interpretations, they 
are valid in the sense of filter logic. [] 
Notice that in the Gentzen system we have Rule (Fs), which corresponds to only 
the first half of Axiom (A2). The second half a~s (So~ s) is derivable using Rule 
wk-(sF). This corresponds to the fact that we can derive a~s (so~_ s) it~ the Hitbert 
system for filter logic from Axiom wk-(A5) and a~s (x ~ s). 
The rest of this section is devoted to sketching the proofs needed to establish 
Theorem 7.4. We again use weak models. A weak model is just as before except 
that it satisfies all instances of Axiom wk-(A5) but not necessarily of Axiom (A5). 
The relevant definitions (satisfaction, elementary extension) are as before. 
We'll start by outlining a proof of completeness for Lr~'(az). First note that 
Axiom (A5) was never actually used in the proof of the Weak Completeness 
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Theorem for L(~), except to get a model satisfying Axiom (A5). Thus that proof 
is essentially also a proof of weak completeness for LVU(~), although a slight bit 
of care shou!d be taken to insure that all instances of Axiom wk-(A5) are true in 
the weak model which is constructed. 
Next, a version for LVU(a~) of the main lemma of L(a,) (Section 3.4) can be 
seen to be true. This time we do not require that Me P'~P. Instead, we require 
that M is a "subset" of some element U M of P~* such that: 9"l*~q~(UM) for the 
appropriate ~/J, as before; and N*~¢(UM) for all q~ such that ~l*~a~s~(s). We 
also requi~e that the elements 3f P~* be fixed; that is, if sop  m• and ~l~*~n~.s, 
then n e M. The proof is analogous to that of the main lemma for L(a~). For 
example, the same consistency criterion holds. The main difference is that Axiom 
wk-(A5) is used to guarantee that the elements of p,a~ are fixed, where before 
axiom (A5) was used to guarantee that M was "fixed". 
Finally, to prove the Completeness Theorem for LH'(~), a result can be proved 
which is analogous to the one in Theorem 3.5. This time, divide ~o~ into oJ~ 
disjoint unbounded subsets (not necessarily stationary). Then apply the main 
lemma for LW'(~) o~ times, just as we did for L(a~) in Theorem 3.5, to get a 
standard model gt. Now define a filter ~ on P,~,(N) by 
X~ iff 3c~oVc~>c~t, UM eX); 
lt's easy to see that ~ is countably complete and contains each set of the form 
{so P,,,(N): soc_ s}. It's also easy to check (by induetioh on complexity, as usuat) 
that for all ce <o~, and all ~ with parameters in M,; U P gJ~*, 
92"~*  ifr (~,~)~. 
In particular, this is true for (e ~---0, so (~)?, ~} has the desired properties. 
The Omitting Types Theorem (OTT) for L~oJ~,(a~) is exactly tile same as before 
except hat we must use the second notion of "strongly omits" (Section 4.3) rather 
than the simpler, first definition (Section 4.1). This is because we used Axiom 
(A5) (in Section 4.3) to show that the first definition implies the second - -  but we 
actually used the second definition in the proof of the OTT for La(~) .  
There are some modifications required to transform the proof of the O'FI" for 
LA(a~) into one for L~'(,~). Let's st:~q first with the finitarv case (Tc  ,,~ta~),,, 
which was handled for L~,~(aM in Section 4.5. Lemma 4.5.t from that section, 
which gave weak models which strongly omit types, has an analogue for LFU(a~); 
moreover, the proofs are similar, just as the proofs of the weak Completeness 
Theorems are similar. Recall that Lemma 4.5.2 showed that the lhcory from lhc 
main Lemma strongly omits any type which is strongly omitted by .~Ijl* (from the 
main Lemma), and then some. [,emma 4.5.2 has an analogue which has the same 
statement and proof. Lemma 4.5.3 said that the theory from the main Lemma 
strongly omits the "M-type". Its analogue for LV"(a,) is that the "s-types" are 
strongiy omitted for all s s P'~*, ~,o that ~;* can be expanded while the elements of 
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p~t~ remain fixed. Finally, the rest of the proof of the OTT for L~"(,~) can be 
obtained from the one for L(n~), much as the proof of the analogue of the "fi~ai 
result" 3.5 could be obtained from the proof of Theorem 3.5. 
There's really no difference between the way the proof of the OTT for L(a~) 
~as extended to LA(a~) and the way the proof of the OTT for LV~'(a~) can be 
xtended to L~'(tn,). However, the general case discussed in Section 4~7 does not 
|ollow for'~:~z , A .~l in the same way that it followed for L/~(~). The problem is that 
full use was made of Axiom (A5) in Section 4.7. Nevertheless, the general case is 
true for L~,~'(~). To see this one has to modify directly the proc~f of the OTT for 
L~t'(~z,). The main modification is in condition (b) of (the analogue of) Lemma 
4.5.2. Suppose the variables of X are v, w, where v is the <-least variable, let <3 
be < I w. Then the modified condition (b) is that if T strongly omits Z (wrt<), 
then T strongly omits 
E(n~, w)(wrt <i), for each m ~ M, if v is first-order, 
,v(~f,w)(wrt <] ), if~: is second-order. 
The latter of these was essentially verified before, and the first is actually easier. 
Now one proceeds with the proof of the OTT as outlined above, but uses the 
modified version of Lemma 4.5.2 when constructing the w~-chain of models. 
~. Concluding remarks 
8.1. Relations with the literature. The Completeness Theorem presented here has 
three principal ancestors: Hutchinson [11], Keisler [15] at~.d Shelah [24]. The debt 
to Keisler's paper is obvious in Sections 3 and 4. 
Shelah's paper, where L,~o,(m.) is introduced (under the notation L(Q~,)) does 
not state any results about L~o~o(az). It is possible, however, to derive compactness 
and abstract completeness (the set of valid sentences is r.e.) of L~(o~) from 
similar results about a different logic contained in Theorem 2.14 of Shelah [24]. 
Thus, our c,-~ntribution is the explicit analysis of the laws of logic needed for 
completeness. As far as Lo,~o(~) is concerned, the only reference seems to be in 
Shelah [25], where he remarks that L(o~), which he now calls L(Q st) (confusingly, 
since this means something else in Shelah [24]), "is very similar to L(Q) for 
models of power R~, and in fact also Lo,,~(Q ~') is very similar to L~,,,~(Q)" where Q 
is "there e~ist uncountably many". 
Hutchinson's [11] has not been mentioned before, but it is where our interest in 
stationary logic began. His main result is that if ~ is a countable model of set 
theory and K is a regular cardinal of ~J)~, then there is an ~ :>~ where there is a 
first new ordinal < K greater than all ordinals a 6 ~,  a < K. This result is a version 
of our main lemma, stated for models of set theory. In fact, Hutchinson's 
Theorem is a special case of our main lemma if one restates the main lemma to 
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apply ~o a "relativized" m quantifier, say ,~,s,c(s). This relativized form reads 
"for almost all countable s g {x l 4,(x)}, q~(s)", where almost all is taken in the 
sense of the cub filter on {x t 4J(x)}. In standard models this can be defined by 
~,,s ,~(s )~s  ,e({x e s ] q,(x)}). 
But there are interesting applications to weak models when one allows n~, but 
not ~.  For example, to obtain Hutchinson's theorem, let q*(x) be (x < ~¢). You can 
turn the countable model of set theory into a weak model ~*  = (~,  P , . . . )  in the 
obvigus way. Fodor's Theorem is used to verify Axiom (A5). Then Hutchinson's 
Theorem is a consequence of the relativized main Lemma. 
The paper Dubiel [7] is also a descendant of Hutchinson [11] and Keisler [15], 
but goes in other directions. 
The Completeness Theorems for L(~t) and LA(~) were announced in the 
abstract Barwise and Makkai [4], but there was a gap in the infinitary case. The 
Omitting Types Theorem and the example of Section 5 were announced in the 
abstract Kaufmann [13], and is part of the second author's Ph.D. Thesis. q'he 
OTT filled in the gap in the proof of the infinitary case of the Completeness 
Theorem. In another ecent abstract, Bruce [6] discusses an extension of forcing 
to L(~). He uses this to give a different proof of completeness and mentions that 
an Omitting Types Theorem for basic formulas can be proved. Bruce has also 
shown how one could give a proof of the Compactness Theorem for L(m) via 
definable uttrapowers. 
The third author has observed that one can combine the argument given here 
with the Magidor-Malitz [21] Completeness Theorem for L((P, O 2, (13,...) to get 
a Compactness and abstract Completeness Theorem for L(m, 02,(13 . . . .  ) (with 
the corresponding results for countable, admissible LA(a~,,Qz, Q 3 . . . .  )). This, 
together with Section 5, gives an example of a countably compacl logic which 
strictly contains L(Q ~, 0 z . . . .  ). 
8.2. Cub-like models. There is an alternate notion of weak model which parallels 
more closely both Keisler's notion of weak model and the notion of filter model 
from S~ction 7, Let ~R#=(~tR, P,~), where PczP,,,,(M) and ~cPower(P) .  We 
define ~#~ by induction on complexity of q,~ as usual, where 
~#~o~,,sq~ iff {s~ P: ~Y~#~q~(s)}~. 
We call ~# a cub-like model if P6~,  and all instances of the axioms of L(~) are 
true in 9T~ ¢*. 
The main lemma is true for cub-like models, and the proof is similar (although 
some extra care must be taken). Alternatively, it can be derived from the main 
lemma for weak models (Section 3.4) by setting up a correspondence between 
the extensional weak models, and the cub-like models in which the elements of 
are definable. The details are left to the reader. 
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Cub-like models are somewhat more natural than weak models, especially in 
view of Section 7, and could probably be used to study what additional (or fewer) 
axioms one might want to put on the "filter" ~. Also, one might be able to find 
applications of cub-like models similar to those in Keisler [15]. However, our 
weak models proved more suitable than cub-like models for proving the Omitting 
Types Theorem, especially the infinitary case. Moreover, the proof shows that we 
can allow third-order elations R~ ~ M ~, x P", and still have Completeness, Com- 
pactness, and Omitting Types Theorems. Thus, for example, we can expand L(a~) 
to allow a relation defining a bijection between M and p~n*. 
8.3. Shelah [24] defines a quoatifier Oi~',,x, where Xc  ~o~. Implicit in his discus- 
sion is a version LX(a~) of L(o~) relativized to a stationary subset of ~,Ja. The 
syntax of LX(az) is that of L(a~). For the semantics we first define a relativized 
notion of almost all. 
Let N be any set of cardinality K~. Pick any increasing sequence of countable 
sets (N,,:a<~o~) such that N=U . . . .  N,, and NA=I..J~,<~N,~ for limits h. Let 
~x m Power(P,,,(N)) be generated by those Yc  P,o,(N) such that 
{a: N,~ ~ Y IU(wlkX)  
is ~ cub subset of ~ot. Notice that if ZcPo,,(N), then P,o, (N)kZ~ x iff 
{a: N~ e Z} f3 X is stationary in ~ol. This suggests that we think of ~x as being the 
cub fifilter relative to X. We should point out that ~x is well-defined; for if we 
replace (/'4° : a < wl) by another increasing sequence of countable sets with unions 
at limits, then the two sequences will agree on a cub subset of COl. 
We can define satisfaction for formulas of LX(a~) using the notation of Section 
7. Let 9~ be a structure for L of cardinality R~. Then we define ~q~(a)  
(wrt LX(a~)) as (9~,~x)~,(a)  (as in Section 7). Then the axioms and rules for 
L(az) are easily seen to be valid in the sense of LX(a~). Eklof has informed us that 
this notion has come up in some of his work on abelian groups. 
Our main observation in this section is that the axioms and rules for L(m) are 
complete for LX(a~), where X is any stationary subset of ~ol. To see this, one can 
modify the proof of the Completeness Theorem as ~ollows. Everything goes the 
same until the chain (~*:  a <~o~) is constructed (Section 3.5). First, divide X 
(rather than w~) into w~ disjoint stationary subsets. Modify the construction of the 
chain (~:  a <o J0 accordingly. It's not hard to check (as before) that in the 
resulting model ~=~j  . . . .  ~)2~, the following is true for each a <~ot, a from 
M,~ O p~n*, and formula q~ of L(a~): 
(~L~×)~(a) i~ ~*~(a). 
In f~ct, these are both equivalent o ~q~(a)  in the sen,,;e of ordinary L(a~). 
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As a corollary we have the compactness of LX(a~). Also, all of this ,:an of 
course be extended to give the Completeness and Omitting Types Theorems fo;' 
LX(,~), for every stationary Xc:  o~. ~ 
8.4. Determinacy. We want to consider structures ~ where the cub filter approxi- 
mates an ultrafilter by satisfying the fi)llowing scheme: 
a~s ~(s)  v a~s -lq: (s). (Det) 
Using Kueker's game theoretic interpretation of the cub filter mentioned in 
Section l, we see that ~sq~(s)v~snq~(s )  asserts that tile game determined by 
ff,(s) is determim, d; i.e., eilher V or 3 has a winning strategy. Borrowing the idea 
t;om Takeuli [27], we call ~ La(o~)-detenninate if ~ is a model of all LA(at~) 
instances of the ,Scheme (Det). This has the effect of making stat s q)(s) equivalent 
to ms  ¢(s) for q~ in La(a~). 
Every covntable structure ~ is L,~(a~).-determinate (since in this case the cub 
filter really is an ultrafilter) but there are also uncountable La(a~)-determinate 
structures. For example, if ~.~ = (M) where M is uncountable, then ~ is L~o,,,,(a~)- 
deterininate. [Proof. A trivial automorphism argument shows that 
~fJ~:a~t~(s,x, t) iff Y2)2~q)(s,x, t)
f~r some (or all) t containing infinitely many elements in addition to U, s~ u {x}, 
from which Scheme (Det) follows.] Another example, noticed in conversation 
with Kunen, is ~)2 = (w;, <). (See Kaufman,l [14] for a proof using a back-and- 
forth argument.) On the other hand, if we use AC to construct a stationary subse' 
X of oJ; which does not contain a cub, then ~IR --: (~o~, <, X) is not [.(aa.)- 
detenninatc. 
The Completeness Theorem for L/~(~) shows that any theory T consistent with 
Scheme (Det) is true in an La(oz)-determinate model. However,  the proof of the 
Completeness Theorem uses the same consequence of AC as the above example 
of a not~-determinate structure (to split w~ into disjoint stationary sets) so let us 
considel what happens if we drop AC and assume, instead, ,:he problematic 
hypothesis AD+DC,  the Axiom of De!erminacy plus Depen(ent  Choice. An 
early resuh of Solovay shows that for AJ of size R~, AD implies that the cub filter 
on M is at.. ultrafilter. (Solovay's result was for P(o~ 0, not Po,,(o~O, but they are 
clearly equivalent since almost every countable subset of oJ~ is an ordinal.) Thus, 
assuming AD, every structure of size ~<~; is determinate. Further, using DC, we 
see that Axi,m~s (A0)-(A6) still hold in such structt, res, 
We claim that Axioms (A())--(A6)+(Det) plus the rule of a~,-generalization is a 
complete system, given AD + DC. The proof is much easier than before, since we 
no longer have to worry about formulas of the form stat s ~(s). Just iterate the 
; Our resuits in Section 8.3 could be derived from our comp[eter~ess theorem and resu]Is in Shelah 
[24], where he treats relativizations to several stationary sets. 
Stationary Logic 221 
main lemma ~o~ times with 4, some tautology. It is easy to see that thc final ~)l is 
indeed a standard model. This also shows that k(a~) is compact in this context. 
Similar observations hold for Omitting Types. 
The Gentzen-style equivalent of Scheme (Det) is the rule: 
q: FI-~, ~0(s') 
q: FI- A, ,~s ~p(s) ' Det-(i-a~) 
as !ong as s' is the last variable of q free in FU A U ¢o(s'). In other words, we drop 
the requirement that s' not be free in FU A needed in Rule (t-a~). If this seems 
strange, notice that the above is the derived rule for (t-stat) and that Scheme (Det) 
makes stat s g,(s) imply a~sq)(s). Conversely, using Rule Det-(Fa~), we derive 
o~s q)(s)v aes "lg2(s) as follows: 
s: q~(s)l-~o(s), 
s: I- ,~(s) ,n~(s) ,  
s: t -~s q~(s), ~(s ) ,  
s: k a~s ~(s), a~s -~(s ) ,  
etc. 
It is clear that more research is needed to explore the relatignship between 
L(,~) and the "determinate logic" of Takeuti [27]. 
9. Open questions 
9.1. As mentioned earlier (Remark 6.9), interpolation fails for L(m), and in fact 
for fragments LA(~). Moreovei, the Suslin-Kleene-property (A-interpolation) 
fails under the assumption MA+--nCH. (See Kaufmann [in 14].) Does the Suslin- 
Kleene-property fail absolutely? How about Beth-definability? 
There is a more general class of questions from abstract model theory which 
remain open. Some of these questions are raised in Makowsky, Shelah and Stavi 
[20]. Problem 3.2 of that paper, which they attribute to Fefcrman, asks if there is 
an extension of L((I) which is I¢~-compact (that is, compact for countable 
theories), axiomatizable, and has interpolation (or even the Suslin-Kleene- 
property). In Problem 3.4 they essentially ask if any proper extension of L,,~o 
which is axiomatizable or l%-compact has any interpolation properties (even the 
Beth- or weak Beth-properties). In a verbal communication Shelah has suggested 
that perhaps there is no extension of L((1) which has interpolation, is blo-compact, 
and satisfies the Downward Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem to o2~. A weaker 
conjecture is that there is no such extension of L((1) which also has a complete 
cut-free Gentzen system (one with the subformula property). This is suggested by 
Remark 6.9. 
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9.2. What are the Hanfnumbers of L(az) and LA(~)?  Keisler has observed that 
Vaught's Gap-o~ Theorem shows that the Hantnumber of L(Q) is "~,, and that 
for admissible sets A # H(~o), the Hanfnumber of La(O) is the same as that of 
La. These seem like reasonable answers for L(a~) and La(a~) as well. Note that 
the well-ordering numbers of L(a=) and LA(a~) equal those of L and La ;  the 
proof in Barwise [2] (111.7,3) for La carries over directly to La(a~). 
9.3. Does every ~ (standard) model for L(m) (or LA(~) )  have an elementary 
sabmodel of cardinality R~? (This is sti'onger than the result of Section 1,5.) 
9.4. The main Lemma (Section 3.4) can be modified to hold f~)t weak ~nodels of 
cer~;ain fragments F of L (~)  which are not closed under (,ms). F needs only to be 
clo~,;ed under the other operations, subformulas, aJ~d certain tran~;formations such 
as 
Vx ,~a,s q~ ~ azs ~x E s q~. 
The model given by this modified main Lemma would be constructed to be a 
model of a smaller fragment F': q~ E F' if[ ~s  ~p ~ F for some s. Thus we can't hope 
to iterate the modified main Lemma. 
We can, however, consider a special case which is closely related to Hutchin- 
son's paper [1 1]. Define the l - f ragment o be the !east set F of formulas which 
has the following properties: it contains those of L; it is closed under the 
first-order operations; and it has the feature that whenever q~ is a formula of L, 
azs,p is a for~lula of E Then by the paragraph above, every ~ak  model ~02" of 
the 1-fragment has an elementary extensior~ 92* in which gl~ is fir,,t-order definable 
(namely, m E Mi f l '92*~m~M),  92* will ~c a proper extension of ~*  if ~Y~*~ 
Qx (x = x). Thus any countable structure ~ which can be expanded to a weak 
model of the l-fragment plus Qx (x = x) has an expansion ~ '  (namely ~ '  = Y2R*) 
such that for some 92'>Y.DT, M is first-order definable with parameters in 92'. 
The problem is to find a reasonable converse of this statement. There is a sort 
of converse for models of set theory: If ~)~<~.,~92 and for some t t~N,  
{xEN:9~t :~Eu}=M,  then ~2 can be expanded to a weak model of the 1- 
fragment plus Ox (x = x). 
905, We discussed the "positive logic" L p°~ of Makowsky and Shelah in Section 
1.2 and again in Sections 6,7. They also define in Makowsky-Shelah [19] a 
"negative logic" L neg with the following new formation rule. If a second-order 
2 The ~nswer to this question turns out to be independent o~' the axioms of set theory, as Harringtor~, 
Kunen and Shetah ave pointed out, This question is l~ktimately connected with Jensen's principle E 
for various J~ "> wt. If V = L, then there is _. structure of size (o2 with no L(~)-etementary submodet of 
power w~. Furthermore, if one collapses a supercompact ardinal to o~2, then every uncountable 
structure has an L(a=)-elementary submudei of size t%. The exact strength of this Downward 
L6wenheim-Skolem Theorem is not clear. For example, Kunen has asked whether it implies that 0 # 
exists. (See also note added in proof.) 
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variable X, occurs negatively in ~(X{), and ~(Xf) is a formula of L ~,  then 
3X, q~(Xi) is a formula of L "~. (The dual rule for forming VX~ q~(X/) can be 
added, or define VX, from :IXJ. The second-order variables X~ range over 
uncountable s ts. 
L ~ is rather powerful; for example, all o~ the Magidor-Malitz quantifiers O" 
for n e w can be expressed in L ~.  Makowski and Shelah [19] raised the question 
of whether L"~' is compact or complete, assuming ~w~. Let's extend that question 
by first defining L"¢g(a~) as being the logic one gets by combining in the obvious 
way L "~g and L(a~). Then we ask: is L "'~g compact or complete, assuming ~o9~? 
Perhaps one can start with a reasonable seZ of axioms, and then modify the proof 
of the Completeness Theorem of L(az) to get completeness of L"~g(a~). (<)to~ will 
have to be used in an essential way.) (See note added in proof.) 
9.6. We've seen in Section 7 that the formulas of L p'~ are invariant or L~'~(~). 
Are these (up to logical equivalence) the only invariant formulas of L~',~(a~)? 
9.7. Investigate more notions of "almost ail". In one direction, one could look for 
other filters on P~,(N) besides the cub filter which give rise to a well-behaved 
logic (with th,'~ same syntax as L(a~) but semantics based on the other filter). For 
example, we "relativize to a stationary subset of ~1" in Section 8.3. Another 
possible modification is to consider "filter models" (~1~, p  ~), where P may be a 
proper subset ol! P,o,(N). The notion of "sampling" in Benda [5] may be relevant, 
since he uses this notion to generalize Hutchinson's Theorem in another direction. 
See also Makowsky, Shelah, and Stavi [20] Section 3, for a treatment of "cofinally 
invariant logics". In still another direction, one could look at P~(N) rather than 
Po,,(N). There is a notion of a cub filter on P~(N) defined in Kueker [17]. One 
could investigate Completeness, Compactness, and Transfer Theorems. These 
questions were essentially raised in Shelah [24]. A relevant paper which solves 
some of these types of questions is Schmerl [26]. 
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Added in proot (Dec 23, 1977): The results mentioned in footnote 2 also appear in a 
preprint "On Shelah's Compactness ofCardinais" by S. Ben-David. Back-and-forth 
systems for L(m) appear in [14]. Similar systems have been developed by Caicedo, 
Makowsky, Seese and Weese. Using these and a construction of Shelah [19], 
Makowsky (with some details upplied by Kaufmann) has shown that -nBeth (L(O), 
L~,~(a~)). With regard to 9.5, Stavi has given a negative answer by showing that wl is 
5~]_ definable in L ~e~. 
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